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As sensor networks become one of the key technologies to realize ubiquitous computing,
security remains a growing concern. Although a wealth of key-generation methods have been
developed during the past few decades, they cannot be directly applied to sensor network
environments. The resource-constrained characteristics of sensor nodes, the ad-hoc nature of
their deployment, and the vulnerability of wireless media pose a need for unique solutions.
A fundamental requisite for achieving security is the ability to provide for data condential-
ity and node authentication. However, the scarce resources of sensor networks have rendered
the direct applicability of existing public key cryptography (PKC) methodologies impractical.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has emerged as a suitable public key cryptographic foun-
dation for constrained environments, providing strong security for relatively small key sizes.
This work focuses on the clear need for resilient security solutions in wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) by introducing e¢ cient PKC methodologies, explicitly designed to accommodate the
distinctive attributes of resource-constrained sensor networks. Primary contributions pertain
to the introduction of light-weight cryptographic arithmetic operations, and the revision of self-
certication (consolidated authentication and key-generation). Moreover, a low-delay group key
generation methodology is devised and a denial of service mitigation scheme is introduced. The
light-weight cryptographic methods developed pertain to a system-level e¢ cient utilization of
the Montgomery procedure and e¢ cient calculations of modular multiplicative inverses. With
respect to the latter, computational complexity has been reduced from O(m) to O(logm), with
little additional memory cost.
Complementing the theoretical contributions, practical computation o¤-loading protocols
have been developed along with a group key establishment scheme. Implementation on state-of-
the-art sensor node platforms has yielded a comprehensive key establishment process obtained in
approximately 50 ns, while consuming less than 25mJ . These exciting results help demonstrate
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1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
Recent advances in wireless network technologies and hardware have yielded multifunctional
miniature sensor nodes which are low-cost as well as low-powered. Sensor networks have be-
come one of the key technologies to realize ubiquitous computing, promising to revolutionize
our ability to sense and control the physical environment while posing numerous unique chal-
lenges to researchers. The vision is to have a sensor network composed of thousands of small
wireless nodes e¢ ciently operating autonomously. WSN technology supports a wide range of
application domains, including industrial control, home automation and environmental, med-
ical and military monitoring systems. According to a recent National Research Council report
[30], WSN technology could well dwarf previous milestones in information technology.
As a result of cost constraints and the need for ubiquitous, invisible and fast deployments,
sensor nodes are physically very small (see gure 1-1 for an illustration), as well as highly
resource-constrained [11]. Among the limited resources are energy (units are typically powered
by a small battery), processing capabilities, communication range and bandwidth and memory
capacity, all of which render the development of wireless nodes a very challenging task.
The three primary functions performed by typical sensor nodes are: (1) to reliably sense and
monitor a variety of physical phenomena, (2) to collaborate with other nodes so as to establish
an ad-hoc network, and (3) to process, analyze and disseminate the data acquired. Since sensor
nodes have limited sensing and computing capabilities, localized collaboration among the nodes
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Figure 1-1: Example of a sensor node, emphasizing its small physcial dimensions
is crucial in order to compensate for each others limitations. Moreover, data correlation is
inherently the strongest among nodes that are geographically close to each other. In order to
facilitate e¤ective collaboration, the use of a clustering infrastructure is necessary [57]. Such
clustering infrastructure should be able to adapt to the dynamically changing environment in
which sensor networks operate.
1.2 Unique Security Considerations and Challenges in WSNs
The sensor network, as a network of embedded sensing systems, has been studied extensively
since the late 90s. Considerable e¤orts have been directed towards making them trustworthy
[59, 56, 66, 19]. This is particularly true in health and military applications where critical
information is frequently exchanged among sensor nodes through insecure wireless media. Tra-
ditionally, security is often viewed as a stand-alone component of a systems architecture, for
which a dedicated layer is employed. This separation is a awed approach to network security,
particularly in resource-constrained, application-oriented sensor networks. In any application,
the security of the system, both in terms of safeguarding against malicious attacks and resilience
under malfunction, is a vital component.
Although the area of network security has been studied for decades, the many unique char-
acteristics of sensor networks have traditionally rendered direct application of existing solutions
impractical. In particular, the following security considerations and requirements need to be
taken into account in the context of sensor networks. First, the ad-hoc nature and extreme dy-
namic environments, in which sensor networks operate, suggest that a prerequisite for achieving
security is the ability to encrypt and decrypt condential data among an arbitrary set of sensor
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nodes. For the same reason, the keys used for encryption and decryption should be established
at the nodes instead of using keys generated o¤-line, prior to deployment. This is important
in order to accommodate for the dynamics of the network, as well as the environment. If
a communications channel is unavailable during a particular time frame, the protocol should
adapt accordingly. The reliability of the links, which is closely related to the issue of channel
dynamics, must be reected by any sensor network protocol such that erroneous links do not
jeopardize the integrity of the key generation process.
Second, due to high node density, scalability is a primary concern. Ad-hoc formation of
node clusters [33, 9, 58, 57], hosting collaborative processing, has been a solution in achieving
both fault tolerance and scalability. In the cluster formation domain, although the issues of
reactivity, energy e¢ ciency, and reliability or fault tolerance have been studied extensively, the
security issue has been left unanswered. This has largely hindered the practical deployment
of collaborative processing algorithms in many sensor network applications. Consequently, an
ad-hoc cluster of nodes is required to establish a joint secret key, and any solid key generation
scheme must scale with respect to the number of nodes in a cluster.
The third aspect pertains to the scarce energy resources, along with low computation ca-
pability, which are always important considerations in security solutions for sensor networks;
there is a clear need for conserving energy on each node when adopting a security protocol. In
addition to the e¢ cient utilization of energy, its balanced consumption across the entire network
should be viewed as a primary goal in an aim to prolong the network lifetime.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation aims to address the fundamental need for a resilient, scalable, resource-e¢ cient
security infrastructure for next-generation sensor networks. In particular, the work focuses
on developing, analyzing and implementing public key cryptographic methodologies uniquely
designed for WSNs environments. The e¤ort spans contributions on resource-e¢ cient arithmetic
derivations of fundamental cryptographic operations. To that end, the di¤erent components of
this work all contribute to the overall theme of applied cryptography for resource-constrained
environments.
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Chapter 2 provides a literature review with focus on general cryptographic foundations,
covering both symmetric as well as public key cryptographic fundamentals. In addition, meth-
ods proposed in the context of WSNs in recent years are described. Chapter 3 introduces the
self-certied public key generation framework that was developed and implemented. A delay-
e¢ cient, self-certied group key generation methodology is presented and analyzed in Chapter
4, while Chapter 5 focuses on the need for denial of service mitigation in resource-constrained
sensor networks. In Chapter 6, various light-weight arithmetic algorithms are described and
analyzed, constituting a novel framework for performing complex cryptographic functions on





Security challenges can be coarsely divided into four closely intertwined categories [62]: secrecy,
authentication, nonrepudiation and integrity control. Secrecy, also called condentiality, means
that the information cannot be understood by anyone for whom it was unintended, i.e., keeping
information out of the hands of unauthorized users. Authentication deals with determining
whom you are talking to prior to revealing sensitive information, i.e., the sender and receiver
can conrm each others identity. Nonrepudiation means that the creator/sender of the infor-
mation cannot deny at a later stage his or her intentions in the creation or transmission of
the information. Integrity makes certain that the information cannot be altered in storage or
transit between sender and intended receiver without the alteration being detected.
Modern cryptography generally includes two classes of algorithms: those based on symmetric-
keys and those based on public-keys. The former uses the same (secret) key for both encryption
and decryption; while the latter requires each user to have two (di¤erent) keys: a public key,
used by the entire world for encrypting message to be sent to that user, and a private key,
which the user needs for decrypting messages. The private key can also be used by its owner
for signing messages, where the signature can be veried by any party that has the non-secret
public key. Public-key cryptographic algorithms are orders of magnitude more complex to im-
plement than symmetric key algorithms. Therefore, in practice all data tra¢ c is encrypted
using symmetric-key cryptography (typically, Advanced Encryption Standard or triple Data
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Encryption Standard), where public key cryptographic techniques are used just for generating
and authenticating the symmetric key used in the symmetric-key encryption/decryption. Un-
fortunately, due to the extremely scarce resources in sensor networks, public key methods are
commonly perceived to be infeasible for sensor nodes.
In the context of wireless sensor networks, much of the work appearing in the literature has
focused on symmetric cryptography techniques, as will be later described in more detail. In
particular, the notion of key-predistribution plays a key role in existing security solutions for




In symmetric cryptography, the same key is used by all parties in both encryption and decryp-
tion of the data exchanged (see gure 2-1 for visual illustration). This key is a secret shared
only by a designated group of users. The primary advantage of symmetric key cryptography
algorithms, such as DES [51] and AES [54], lies in that they are very fast, and hence are used
for processing large amounts of data. However, a major disadvantage of these schemes per-
tains to the fact that the secret key must be agreed upon prior to the exchange of information
and respective encryption and decryption processes. There are no known ways to generate and
agree upon a shared secret key over insecure media in the realm of symmetric key cryptography,
hence it is usually combined with Public Key Cryptography (PKC) which provides a solution
to this very issue, as will be described in more detail in section 2.3.
2.2.2 The Data Encryption Standard (DES)
Adopted in 1976 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and made
publicly available in 1977, the Data Encryption Standard [51] (previously known as the Lucifer
algorithm) became a very widely employed technique in a short period of time. As quoted by
NIST in 1999 [52], The goal (of DES) is to completely scramble the data and key so that every













Figure 2-1: The foundations for symmetric cryptography: Alice is encrypting the plain message,
and Bob is decrypting the chiphertext, while both use the same shared secret key (redrawn from
[42])
there should be no correlation between the ciphertext and either the original data or key.
DES is a symmetric key cryptography method which encrypts and decrypts a 64-bit plaintext
with a 64-bit key, although the e¤ective key strength is only 56 bits. The 16 steps (as the number
of steps is increased, security of the algorithm increases exponentially) of the DES protocol start
with 64 bits of plaintext and ends with 64 bits of ciphertext. As indicated above, the size of the
key is 64 bits, but only 56 of them are e¤ective in the encryption process; the least signicant
bit of each byte is a parity bit and is to be ignored. This bit is set such that all bytes have an
odd number of 1s. Next, we briey review the steps comprising the DES algorithm (see [51]
for more details).
Steps for transforming the 64-bit key
The rst two phases of the protocol deal with permuting the 64-bit key:
1. The 64 bits are transformed into 56 bits using a permutation called the Permuted Choice
1 (PC   1).
2. The new set of 56 bits is transformed into sixteen 48-bit sub-keys called K1   K16. A
subsequent permutation is generated using the Permuted Choice 2 (PC 2) scheme. These
16 sub-key are used in the 16 rounds of the DES encryption and decryption process.
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Steps for encryption and decrypting data
The following are the steps required to encrypt (and as will be described below, to decrypt) a
64-bit plaintext (see gure 2-2 for details):
1. The plaintext is passed through a permutation phase called the Initial Permutation (IP ).
2. Following the Initial Permutation, the 64 bits are substituted (or shu­ ed) such that the
right-most 32 bits are exchanged with the left 32 bits. The right-most 32 bits are identied
as R1 and the left 32 bits are identied as L1:
3. The permuted and initially substituted text is passed though 16 identical rounds. Each
round, i; takes the output of the previous round as its input, and performs the following
(i = 2~17):
a. Ri and Li, along with Ki are inputs to a function f:
b. Li+1 = Ri
c. Ri+1 = f(Li; Ri;Ki)
4. The nal substitution consists of exchanging the right-most 32 bits (identied as R17)
with the left-most 32 bits (identied as L17)
5. The nal step is to apply Inverse Initial Permutation (IP 1) to the pre-output. The
result is a completely encrypted ciphertext.
In order to decrypt the nal ciphertext, the exact same procedure should be applied. The
only di¤erence lies in the order of the 48-bit of keys (K1   K16) that are used. When the
identical 16 rounds are applied, the order of the keys is reversed, i.e., instead of using the keys
in the order K1 to K16; they are used in the order of K16 to K1:
Unfortunately, brute force methods have made it possible to signicantly reduce the amount
of time needed to uncover a DES key. Despite the fact that a 56-bit key is simply not large
enough for high security applications, DES is still widely used by many applications. As a
consequence of its vulnerabilities, stronger symmetric encryption schemes that rely on similar
rationale as DES have been standardized, including the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[54] and Triple DES (3DES) [53].
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Figure 2-2: The DES algorithm owchart (redrawn from [42])
2.3 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptographic methods were introduced in the late 70s as a novel manner by which
data security can be achieved. They inherently rely on asymmetric operations, which comple-
ment each other in a mathematically elegant manner. Coarsely speaking, PKC methods are
employed by three primary applications:
1. Encryption that is based on a public key (k+) and decryption based on a private key (k )
(see gure 2-3 for visual illustration),
2. Signature generation based on a private key, and signature verication based on a public
key, and
3. Generation of a symmetric secret key over an insecure channel.
These applications are customarily based on one of two possible intractable mathematical


























Figure 2-3: The foundations for PKC: Alice is encrypting a plain message, m, using Bobs
public key, while Bob is decrypting the chiphertext with his private key (redrawn from [42])
operation. A representative security framework that is based on the factorization complexity is
RSA [60]. Applications that are based on the discrete log problem include Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography (ECC) [41] PKC is approximately three orders of magnitude slower than symmetric
cryptography methods for comparable security strength. However, their capacity to operate
over insecure media with no prior exchange of information is unmatched, rendering them highly
pertinent for a broad range of applications. The subsequent sections provide a brief overview
of PKC fundamental building blocks.
2.3.1 The Discrete Logarithm Problem
Let x and n denote two positive real numbers, where N is a nite group and n 2 N: Let p be
a very large prime number. The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) can be stated as follows:
Given n; p and nxmod p; one is required to compute x: Computing x is extremely di¢ cult
(especially for a large enough p); and there are no known e¢ cient algorithms to do so.
2.3.2 The Di¢ e-Hellman Key Agreement
Di¢ e-Hellman (DH) key agreement [22] developed in 1976 was a revolutionary protocol which
instigated the eld of public key cryptography, hence paving the way for New Directions in
Cryptography (which was, in fact, the title of the original journal publication). Using the DH
key exchange method, two users are able to establish a shared secret key while communicating
over an insecured channel. The pairwise secret key, as its name suggests, will be known only
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to the two parties involved in the key generation process, while preventing any unwanted third
party individuals from exposing the key.
Let us assume that the two users, whose purpose is to agree on a shared secret key, are
Alice and Bob. Each of the latter holds a di¤erent private integer value, x and y, respectively.
These private values are considered to be a secret key to each party and can be generated
randomly. Both parties must agree on two public parameters: p and a. p is a large prime
number and a is an integer smaller than p: Alice takes her secret key, the scalar x; computes
the modular exponentiation expression axmod p and transmits it to Bob (over the unsecured
channel). Then, Bob takes his secret key, the scalar y; computes the modular exponentiation
expression aymod p, and sends it to Alice. Since the Discrete Log Problem (DLP) applies,
none of the users can compute the other partys secret key. The shared key is calculated by
each user as the exponentiation axymod p (Alice calculates the modular exponentiation between
the message received from Bob and her private key, i.e., (ax)ymod p and Bob calculates the
exponentiation between the message received from Alice and his private key, i.e., (ay)xmod p:)
Due to the commutative attribute of exponentiation, both users end up with the same shared
key, axymod p: Here the discrete log problem applies again, i.e., none of the users (Alice or
Bob) can compute each others secret key nor can any outside eavesdropper compute the value
of the shared secret key axymod p by knowing the two values aymod p and axmod p. Figure
2-4 depicts the DH process.
2.3.3 The RSA Methodology
The RSA methodology, which was rst published in 1978 by R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir and L.
Adleman, is an algorithm for public-key encryption [60]. This algorithm was one of the rst
used in the world of Public Key Cryptography and is e¢ cient for both encryption and signature
applications. The approach of RSA is based on Fermats Little Theorem [40], and its security
is derived from the di¢ culty of factoring large integers. The keys traditionally used are 1024
bits in size, which o¤er comparable cryptocomplexity strength to that of an 80-bit symmetric




1. Choose two large prime numbers p; q. (e.g., 1024 bits each)
2. Compute n = p  q, z = (p  1)(q   1)
3. Choose e (such that e < n) that has no common factors with z. (i.e., e and z are relatively
prime).
4. Choose d such that e  d  1 is exactly divisible by z. (i.e., e  dmod z = 1 ).
The public key (k+) is the pair (n; e), while the private key (k ) is the pair (n; d).
Encryption and Decryption Given the public key (n; e) and the private key (n; d) as
computed above:
 To encrypt a bit pattern, m (such that m < n), compute c = memodn (i.e., c is the
remainder when me is divided by n).
 To decrypt a received bit pattern c, compute m = cdmodn (i.e., m is the remainder when
cd is divided by n).
As can be seen in this case, the claim is that m = cdmodn) m = (memodn)dmodn. To
understand why such an assertion holds, we need to refer to Fermats Little Theorem [40]: If
p; q are prime and n = p  q, then: xymodn = xymod(p 1)(q 1)modn:
Applying the above to our RSA case, we have (memodn)dmodn = medmodn: Using
Fermats Little Theorem we arrive at the deduction that medmodn = medmod(p 1)(q 1)modn:
Since ed is chosen to be divisible by (p 1)(q 1) with remainder 1, we know thatmedmod(p 1)(q 1)
modn = m1modn: However, given that the message m is chosen such that m < n; we conclude
that m1modn = m; hence cdmodn = (memodn)dmodn = m:
2.3.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
In 1985, elliptic curve systems were introduced in cryptography by Neal Koblitz from the
University of Washington [40]. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a public key cryptography
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framework used for encrypting and decrypting information. Many elliptic curves have been
proposed, each with its own cryptocomplexity attributes [17]. Points on an elliptic curve are
used in order to create a public key, whereby the number of bits in a key can vary, typically
ranging from 79 to 359. ECC is considered to provide the highest security per bit [1]; a 163-bit
ECC application provides the same security as a 1024-bit application over a composite integer.
This attractive feature of ECC makes it most suitable for sensor network as well as other
resource-limited platforms.
An elliptic curve is a nite collection of points in a two-dimensional plane, over GF (p) or
over GF (2n). When operating over GF (2n) the elements in the eld are primitive polynomials.
When operating over GF (p); the relation between the (x; y) coordinates of the curve points is
specied by the equation y2 =
 
x3 + ax+ b

mod p, where p is the order of the generating point,
i.e., the nite number of points on the curve. Since ECC deals with public key cryptography,
there is a need to dene the public and private keys. The private key is a scalar and the public
key is a point on the curve which is created by multiplying a chosen generating point. As
the name suggests, a generating point is a point on the curve that can generate all the other
possible points - which constitute a nite group. This point-by-scalar multiplication is the
core mathematical foundation behind ECC. As in the case with RSA, the discrete log problem
applies here as well, i.e., by knowing the public key (which is a product of the generating point
and the private key) and the generating point, it is computationally infeasible to obtain the
private key. This property is often referred to as the elliptic curve discrete log problem or
ECDLP.
Di¢ e Helman over an Elliptic Curve
In order to encrypt and decrypt information, the DH method can be employed in order to
exchange keys and create a secret key shared by two users. Both parties, Alice and Bob, need
to agree on a specic curve and on a point on the curve, Q. Alice holds her secret key, the
scalar x; computes the product Qx and sends it to Bob. Bob holds his secret key, the scalar y;
computes the product Qy and sends it to Alice. The shared key is calculated by each user as
the product x  yQ. Alice calculates the product between the message received from Bob and
her private key, i.e., (Qy)  x. Bob calculates the product between the message received from
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Alice and his private key, i.e., (Qx)  y: Due to the commutative attribute of multiplications
over elliptic curves, both users will carry the same shared key, x  yQ: Since the discrete log
problem applies, none of the users (Alice or Bob) can compute each others secret key nor can
any outside eavesdropper compute the value of the shared secret key x  yQ by knowing the
two values Qy and Qx. See gure 2-5 for an illustration of the procedure.
2.3.5 Operations Over Elliptic Curves
A point on the elliptic curve will from here on be denoted by a bold capital letter, e.g. A,
whereby the points coordinates are labeled (xA; yA): The following are the basic operations
dened over elliptic curves, applicable to the entire eld of GF (p):
Denition of a negative point
If the coordinates of A are (xA; yA), then the coordinates of  A are (xA; yA): The point at
innity is denoted by O. This point plays the role of 0 in the sense that A + ( A) = O, and
A+O = A (where + denotes a point addition, under the procedures treated next).
Point addition
Let T and U be two points on an elliptic curve. The coordinates (xR; yR) of R = T+U (for
xT 6= xU) are calculated as follows:
b = (yT   yU)  (xT   xU) 1mod p
xR =
 
b2   xT   xU

mod p
yR = [(xU   xR)  b  yU]mod p
Point doubling
Let S and U be two points on an elliptic curve. The coordinates (xS; yS) of S = 2 U are
calculated as follows:
c = (3  (xU)2 + a):(2  yU) 1mod p; (a is the scalar dened on the curve)
xS = c
 1mod p
yS = [(xU   xS)  c  yU]mod p
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x- a private key
A B
a- an integer smaller than p
p- a large prime number
y- a private key
The generated shared key:
axy mod p
(ay )x mod p  = axy mod p  = (ax )y mod p
ay mod p ax mod p
Figure 2-4: The Di¢ e-Hellman key agreement process
x- a private key
(scalar)
A B
Q- an known point  on the elliptic curve
y- a private key
(scalar)
x Q
The generated shared key:
x  y Q
y Q
( y Q  )   x  = x  y Q  = ( x Q  )  y
Figure 2-5: Generating a shared secret key using the Di¢ e Helman method over an elliptic
curve
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Multiplying a curve point by a scalar
As indicated previously, a multiplication between a point on a curve and a scalar is the funda-
mental calculation in the world of ECC, hence the importance of understanding it. Let k be
an n-bit scalar. ki denote the i-th bit in the binary representation of k starting with the least
signicant bit, where i = 0; 1; : : : ; n   1: Multiplying a point on a curve by a scalar yields a
new point on the curve. Assuming that L is a point on a curve, the curve point C = kL can
be calculated by the following double-and-add algorithm. It should be noted that doubling a
point and point addition are executed as described above.
C = 0
for i = 0 to n  1
L = 2L
if ki = 1 then
C = C+ L
end
end
This process is a basic shift-and-add procedure, where shifted (doubled) values of the curve
point L are generated and added to an accumulator based on the binary representation of the
multiplier k. An alternative version of a double-and-add process is to scan the bits of k starting
with the most signicant bit. In this case, the dynamic value of C is doubled, rather than the
xed point L:
2.3.6 Example of an Elliptic Curve Over GF (p)
We conclude this section by providing an illustration of an elliptic curve. As indicated above,
the general structure of an elliptic curve over GF (p) is: y2 =
 
x3 + ax+ b

mod p: Let us





mod23: There are 23 points satisfying this equation: (0; 0), (1; 5), (1; 18), (9; 5),
(9; 18), (11; 10), (11; 13), (13; 5), (13; 18), (15; 3), (15; 20), (16; 8), (16; 15), (17; 10), (17; 13),
(18; 10), (18; 13), (19; 1), (19; 22), (20; 4), (20; 19), (21; 6) and (21; 17). Figure 2-6 depicts the
actual curve derived.
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2.4 Key Pre-Distribution Schemes in WSNs
Numerous schemes have been proposed in the literature for pairwise and group key agreement.
However, as shown by Carman et al. [20], most are not suitable for sensor network environments
due to lack of information regarding the network topology prior to deployment and the resource
limitations of the sensor nodes. Therefore, a mainstream thrust for secret sharing among n sen-
sor nodes has been key pre-distribution schemes. Many symmetric key pre-distribution methods
have been studied in recent years, with emphasis on multicast and broadcast communication
[15], [31], [16]. It is noted that traditional key pre-distribution schemes, such as sharing a sin-
gle key for the entire network or assigning a unique key to each pair of nodes, are not viable
solutions in sensor networks. The single key approach would result in compromising all com-
munication links in the network if a single node is captured by the adversary. The pairwise
key sharing for every two nodes has the advantage that capturing any node by the adversary
does not directly a¤ect the security of any link between two non-compromised nodes. However,
the pairwise key approach requires the storage of n   1 keys in each node (which is unduly
large given the memory limitation of sensors). Moreover, it would be hard to scale the network
(revocation or appending of sensor nodes) [20].
To address these drawback, Eschenauer and Gligor [28] proposed a random key pre-distribution
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scheme: before deployment each node is loaded with a subset of a large key pool. A shared-key
discovery phase takes place during the initialization in the operation environment where every
node discovers its neighbors within the wireless communication range with which it shares a
key. This can be simply achieved by storing the identiers of keys in each sensor node (prior
to deployment) and broadcasting these identiers to the adjacent nodes during the shared-key
discovery phase. A link exists between two nodes only if they share a key (from their stored
key ring) and all communication on that link is secured by link encryption. Trade-o¤s can be
made between sensor-memory, cost and connectivity, and design parameters can be adapted
to t the operational requirements of a particular environment. It has been shown that this
scheme is superior to traditional key pre-distribution schemes. Based on the basic scheme in
[28], Chan et al. [19] proposed a q-composite random key pre-distribution scheme, which in-
creases the security of key setup such that an attacker must compromise many more nodes to
achieve a high probability of compromising communication links. The di¤erence between the
q-composite scheme and the scheme in [28] is that at least q common keys (q  0) are needed
to establish secure communications between a pair of nodes. It is shown that by increasing the
value of q, network resilience against sensor-node capture is improved. However, as the number
of compromised nodes increases, the fraction of a¤ected pairwise keys increases rapidly. As a
result, a small number of compromised nodes may a¤ect a large fraction of the communica-
tion links. Du et al. [23] combined the random key pre-distribution method with the classical
method of Bloms key pre-distribution. The goal of their scheme is to increase networks re-
silience against node capture without using more memory. The drawback of this scheme is the
computation overhead that occurs at each node and the oversimplied random graph model.
Similarly, Liu and Ning [21] developed a pairwise key establishment using the polynomial-based
key pre-distribution protocol and probabilistic key distribution. It has been indicated that the
scheme has several advantages. In particular, unless the number of compromised sensors that
share a common polynomial exceeds a threshold, the sensor-node capture does not lead to the
compromise of the links established by non-compromised nodes. Peer intermediaries for key
establishment (PIKE) have been proposed in [18] similar to the 2D grid-based scheme in [21].
However, the main disadvantage of this method is the size of the key ring stored in the memory
of each sensor. Every sensor has to store 2(m   1) = O(
p
n) keys while in [21], the memory
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requirement is O(t) where t, the degree of the polynomials, is independent of the network size.
Moreover, we need to assume that none of the involving nodes are compromised during the
key-path discovery.
Key pre-distribution means the following: each sensor node before deployment is pre-
congured with a subset of keys (called a key ring) along with their associated identiers.
After the (random) deployment of sensor nodes, a shared-key discovery phase takes place by
which two nodes within the communication range of each other nd out whether they share
at least one common key [28]. Then, each node uses their shared key (we refer as direct link
key) to establish a secure communication link. We assume that the sensor nodes are not mo-
bile and they have similar computation and communication capabilities. The nodes are also
limited in memory and power. We call a network connectedif there exists a communication
path consisting of hops between every two nodes. The robustness of sensor networks is linked
to their connectivity. Without such connectivity, the network loses proper functionality. The
communication range of the sensors can be varied in order to achieve connectivity. However,
the communication range should also be kept minimal because of very limited power supply.
In the attack model, we assume that if a node is compromised, all the information (including
the stored keys in the key ring of the node) within the node will also be compromised.
Despite their popularity, key pre-distribution schemes o¤er partial solution with respect to
scalability, cryptographic robustness and the ability to append and revoke security attributes.
For example, scalability is limited, since the probability of two or more nodes sharing a pre-
distributed key decreases rapidly as the number of nodes increases. This results in a need for
a key discovery process, in which nodes communicate with other nodes in order to identify a
joint secret key a process that necessitates additional resources.
The cryptographic robustness is also lacking in pre-distribution schemes, as reected by
two aspects: rst, the use of static key rings which are assigned to the nodes do not facilitate
dynamic key generation, i.e. the generation of a new secret key per session, thereby reducing
the cryptographic strength o¤ered; second, by capturing a node an adversary party may be able
to decrypt data exchanges between other nodes in the network (given that the nodes utilize
keys that are present in the captured node).
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2.5 Self-Certied Key Establishment
A self-certied key establishment is a key distribution technique in which the authentication
process is embedded inside the key generation process. Since there is no need for an authenti-
cation process preceding the key generation process (as is usually the case), this procedure is
very e¢ cient, and hence can be practical for WSN applications.
The basic techniques introduced in this section are derived from the work in [7]. The
mathematical foundations rely on ECC cryptographic techniques pertaining to operations over
a nite group of points in which the discrete log problem applies. Di¢ e-Hellman (DH) key
exchange is a cryptographic protocol, which allows two parties that have no prior knowledge
of each other to jointly establish a shared secret key over an insecure communications channel.
This key can then be used to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric key cipher.
Denote a pointon an elliptic curve by a capital letter in bold font (e.g., P). Multiplication
of a point by a scalar (e.g., sP) is commonly referred to as an exponentiation, in which s is
called the exponent.
ECC operations are based on the existence of a generating point G, with an order ordG,
which is known to all parties. The private and public keys are issued by the CA to all users in
the network. The CA holds a pair of keys, a private key which is a scalar denoted by d, and a
public key, which is a point denoted byR, whereR = dG. Let IDi denote the ID or any other
relevant attributes of a user Ni. The notation H(s;P) refers to a scalar obtained by hashing
a scalar s and a point P. In general, the following framework applies to all key generation
methodologies presented here. First, key-issuing takes place, whereby a user acquires o¤-line
a set of public and private keys. Next, a joint key is established online via self-certied DH,
followed by key conrmation.
2.5.1 Key-issuing Procedures
The CA issues to user Ni a private key (xi), and the public key (Ui). The key-issuing procedure
is thus performed as follows:
1. The CA generates a random scalar hi
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2. The CA then generates user Nis public and private keys as follows:
Ui = hi G; xi = [H(IDi;Ui) hi + d] mod ordG (2.1)
3. The CA issues the values xi and Ui to Ni;
4. Ni can establish the validity of the values issued to it by checking whether
xi G = H(IDi;Ui)Ui +R
2.5.2 Self-certied Fixed Key-establishment
A self-certied DH xed-key-establishment is achieved by the following two steps: (1) Ni and
Nj exchange the pairs (IDi;Ui) and (IDj ;Uj), respectively, and (2) Ni and Nj generate the
session-key,
Kij (generated by Ni) = xi  [H(IDj ;Uj)Uj +R]
Kji (generated by Nj) = xj  [H(IDi;Ui)Ui +R]: (2.2)
See gure 2-7 for details
Key conrmation should now follow, where Ni and Nj should encrypt and decrypt a test
message, using their keys Kij and Kji , and verify that they actually share the same key.
The two keys are expected to be identical, having the value xi  xj  G. Verifying, by an
independent key-conrmation procedure, that the keys generated by the two users are indeed
equal establishes their correct identities. This closes the trust loop controlled by the CA. Key
conrmation can be executed by using, for example, DES.
2.5.3 Self-certied Ephemeral Key-establishment
A self-certied DH ephemeral key-establishment is achieved by the following steps: (1) Ni and
Nj generate uniform i.i.d. random pvi and pvj , respectively, (2) Ni calculates the ephemeral
value EVi = pvi G, while Nj calculates the ephemeral value EVj = pvj G, (3) Ni and
Nj exchange the values (IDi;Ui;EVi) and (IDj ;Uj ;EVj), respectively, and (4) Ni and Nj
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Certification Authority (CA)
U- The public key
x- The private key
R- The CA’s public key
K- The joint session key
Node i
Ui, xi, R Uj, xj, R
Node i
Node i Node i
Ui, IDi,
Uj, IDj,
Kij=xix[H(IDj, Uj)xUj+R] Kji=xjx[H(IDi, Ui)xUi+R]
Joint fixed key:
Figure 2-7: Self-certied ECC-based xed key generation process
generate the ephemeral session key,
Kij (generated by Ni) = pvi  [H(IDj ;Uj)]Uj +R] + (xi + pvi)EVj
Kji (generated by Nj) = pvj  [H(IDi;Ui)]Ui +R] + (xj + pvj)EVi (2.3)
As specied for the xed-key case, key conrmation (which can be executed by using DES for
example) should now follow. That is, Ni and Nj should encrypt and decrypt a test message,
using their keys Kij and Kji, and verify that they actually share the same key. The two keys
are expected to be identical, having the value pvi  xj G + xi  pvj G + pvi  pvj G.
Verifying that the keys generated by the two users are indeed equal, establishes their correct
identities.
It is very important to emphasize that in both the ephemeral and xed-key generation
procedures, the authentication process is indeed imbedded in the key generation process. This
realization pertains to the fact that Kij and Kji will indeed be identical only if the proper
private keys, xi and xj ; are used respectively. If users Ni and Nj hold the correct secret key
(issued only to them by the CA) the key conrmation process will indeed conrm the proper
identication as well as the fact that their keys are indeed identical.
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Chapter 3
Self-Certied Public Key Generation
for Resource-Constrained Sensor
Networks
In this chapter we describe a comprehensive ECC-based self-certied key establishment method-
ology, suitable for WSN environments. Furthermore, a method for generating a joint secret key
between an ad-hoc cluster of nodes is introduced. Although group key establishment based on
public key cryptography has been considered in the literature [39], there is little to no treatment
of the issue of authentication. In fact, a common assumption made by these schemes is that
an authentication mechanism is already available, while the proposed method also concerns the
e¢ cient integration of self-certied authentications.
In an e¤ort to e¤ectively distribute the computational load between the nodes, we propose to
partition the self-certied key-establishment process into secure and non-secure operations. This
enables o¤-loading the non-secure operations from a node participating in the key-establishment
process to available neighboring nodes which do not. Such distribution of the computational
e¤ort yields improved load-balancing, shorter execution times and more homogeneous power
consumption across the network.
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3.1 Adopting a Load-balanced Key-establishment Procedure
The self-certied xed and ephemeral key establishments described in sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3,
respectively, can be used as basis for key generations in WSNs. As shown in section 2.5.2,
a primary attribute o¤ered by the method of self-certied xed-key establishment lies in the
number of exponentiations required to calculate the value xi  xj G. As indicated, node Ni
calculates Kij = xi  [H(IDj ;Uj) Uj +R] = [xi H(IDj ;Uj) mod ordG] Uj + xi R.
The value xi R, which utilizes xed values (where xi denotes nodes Ni private key and R
denotes the CAs public key), can be pre-calculated and stored by Ni. Therefore Ni is able to
calculate its session-key by the single online exponentiation [xiH(IDj ;Uj) mod ordG]Uj ,
generating a certied key using only one exponentiation. In comparison, a standard xed-key
establishment requires three online ECC exponentiations (two for validating a certicate and
one for the key generation). Similar rationale follows for the case of ephemeral key generation,
as described in 2.5.3, Note that the calculations performed by Ni and Nj are
Kij = [pvi H(IDj ;Uj) mod ordG]Uj + (xi + pvi) (EVj +R)  xi R
Kji = [pvj H(IDi;Ui) mod ordG]Ui + (xj + pvj) (EVi +R)  xj R (3.1)
The pre-calculation and storage of xiR (which is xed for all key-establishment procedures
in which Ni participates) would enable Ni to calculate its session-key by performing only two
online exponentiations [pviH(IDj ;Uj) mod ordG]Uj and (xi+ pvi) (EVj +R). This is
preceded by the o¤-line calculation of EVi = pviG, executed at each session using a di¤erent
pvi. The latter can be carried out at any stage prior to establishing a communication session
with Nj .
3.1.1 O¤-loading of Computational E¤orts to Neighboring Nodes
O¤-loading non-secure tasks from a component having limited resources to an assisting node
is not new. This approach is used for example in RSA key generation [7] and in broadcast
encryption [10]. In this work, the new approach to load-balancing among WSNs motes is based
on manipulations with Di¢ e-Hellman key-establishment mathematics.
Both xed-key and ephemeral-key establishments are treated here. Their suggested employ-
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Cluster A Cluster B
Figure 3-1: Illustration of two clusters established in accordance with a moving target
ment in WSNs is illustrated in gure 3-1.
In the interest of distributing the power consumption across the sensor network, we employ
an o¤-loading technique in which nodes assist other nodes by performing part of the required
calculations. In the context of security operations, we must prove that calculations that are
o¤-loaded, and are subsequently transmitted over potentially eavesdrop-prone channels, do not
jeopardize the trustworthiness of the process.
As shown in section 2.5.3, the ad-hoc operations executed during the ephemeral key-
establishment are [pviH(IDj ;Uj)mod ordG] and (xi+ pvi) (EVj +R): The rst must be
executed at the node Ni as it contains the private ephemeral value pvi. Assisting neighboring
nodes (not included in the ad hoc cluster, but with proximity to it) will calculate the value
(xi+ pvi) (EVj +R): It should be noted that all nodes are assumed to have knowledge of R.
While xi and pvi are secret, their sum does not disclose their values. Moreover, even though xi
is xed, pvi never repeats itself. In other words, the secret key xi is masked with the random
noise pvi. It is further noted that the neighboring assisting node is not necessarily trusted in
delivering a correct answer. The assisting node merely performs mathematical processing and
does not issue any decisions. An attempt to send a misleading result by an assisting node will
be detected during the key conrmation step.
3.1.2 Communication Framework
The approach taken in this section is that of exploiting spatial o¤-loading of calculation tasks
needed to establish a joint key between two nodes. Available nodes, not included in the current
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cluster, assist other nodes by concurrently performing portions of the necessary computations.
Figure 3-2 illustrates a basic network topology in which nodes A and B wish to establish a
joint ephemeral key, with the assistance of nodes C and D. The following protocol outlines the
process by which a joint key is established between the two nodes:
1. A broadcasts a message to B, which includes a unique ID number, IDA, requesting to
establish a joint key.
2. B replies with a conrmation broadcast message containing IDB.
3. A and B exchange (IDA;UA;EVA) and (IDB;UB;EVB), respectively.
4. Nodes A and B look for assistance from other neighboring nodes not included in their
cluster. In this case, they will seek assistance from nodes C and D, by sending them,
respectively, assist request (AST_REQ) messages containing IDC and IDD. Neighboring
nodes C and D, receive the assist request messages from nodes A and B, respectively, and
reply, if possible, by sending assist acknowledgement (AST_ACK) messages indicating
their availability to take part in the calculation process. As part of the AST_ACK
message, both C and D include unique ID numbers, IDC and IDD.
5. Upon receiving AST_ACKmessages from C and D, A and B respond by sending data that
includes IDCA; (xA+ pvA),.(EVA+R) and IDDB; (xB + pvB), (EVB +R) respectively.
6. C and D send the result of their computation processes, i.e.,(xi + pvi) (EVj +R) and
(xj + pvj) (EVi +R) respectively, to A and B, respectively.
7. The joint key is established, followed by key conrmation.
The described o¤-loading concept suggests that assisting nodes are self organized in the
sense that there is no centralized entity pairing nodes. Therefore, a key question is how are
assisting nodes identied. The proposed method relies on the use of a single weight value, wi,
calculated at each node i, reecting on its availability to assist. For example, the weight can be


















Figure 3-2: Network protocol employed by the proposed key establishment methodology. Nodes
A and B, who aspire to establish a joint key, are assisted in calculations by neighboring nodes
C and D
Let us assume node Ni receives a request for assistance message, AST_REQ, from a neigh-




) amount of time
to respond with an acknowledgement message, AST_ACK. The parameter () controls how
fast the Gaussian function decreases with respect to the weight (wi). If, during the waiting
period, a di¤erent neighboring node, say Nj , broadcasts an AST_ACK message, Ni will dis-
card the AST_REQ and Nj is assumed to serve as the assisting node. However, if Ni does not
receive any AST_ACK indicating assistance before the waiting time expires, Ni will become
the assisting node.
If the node that requests assistance does not receive any AST_ACK within a certain amount
of time, twait, then this node will perform all calculations. Such scenario might occur when all
neighboring nodes are at a low-energy level or the communication link has errors.
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3.2 Group-key Establishment based on Pairwise DH Key Es-
tablishment
3.2.1 Formation of a Group Key
It is next shown how a group of m nodes generates a secret session key Ks joint to all nodes
in the group and not attainable to any party outside the group. In this respect it is noted
that the self authentication of the DH keys is based on the identity, IDs, of the participants.
These identity values can also be associated with attributes of nodes, rather than their explicit
identities. For example, they can be associated with parameters that specify the meaning of the
group. That is, nodes that do not posses appropriate parameters allowing them to participate
in the group cannot force themselves into the group.
Let the nodes in the group be indexed in a chain, where node Ni generates two DH keys,
one jointly generated with node Ni 1 and one with Ni+1; i = 0; 1; : : : ;m  1. Although this is
not a necessity, the indexing is cyclic. That is, Nm 1 and N0 also generate a joint key. For
simplicity, let us further assume that m is even. These 2m DH keys can all be generated within
two time slots. Let Ki+ denote the DH key joint to nodes Ni and Ni+1, generated during the
rst time slot for even is, and Ki  denote the DH keys generated during the second time slot
for odd is. This way, during each slot, every node is busy generating a joint DH key with
exactly one other node.
Based on the fact that each node possesses two DH keys, one joint to the preceding node
in the chain and one joint to the subsequent node (where Nm 1 and N0 are considered to be
consecutive), the secret session key Ks, joint to all members in the group, is then generated
as follows. A certain node Nj in the group (Nj can be an arbitrary node, or a node with
some distinct preferences such as the cluster head or group leader) generates a random Ks. It
encrypts Ks with Kj+ and sends the ciphertext to Nj+1. Node Nj+1 decrypts the ciphertext,
as it also has Kj+, thereby recovering Ks. It then encrypts Ks with the DH key joint to Nj+1
and Nj+2, etc. This way, Ks securely propagates in the chain, by decryption and encryption
operations taking place at each node. Ks nally gets back to the originator Nj , who veries
that the received Ks is identical to the original.
Although calculations are carried out concurrently by the odd and even nodes, we must
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consider the fact that transmission of information may be done sequentially, since the same
wireless channel is shared by all nodes. Letting taccess and tx denote the expected channel
access time and transmission/reception times, respectively, the aggregate time consumed by
the group key establishment process, Tgk, can be expressed as
Tgk = 2m(taccess + tx) + tDH ; (3.2)
where tDH is the overall time required to perform the actual DH calculations. One should note
that the access and transmission times are expected to be in the order of milliseconds, while
the DH related computations are in the order of seconds (shown for MICA2 sensor platforms
[45] and Intel 2 sensor platforms [6]). To that end, the fact that communications are done
sequentially has little impact on the overall delay of the group key establishment process.
It should be noted that the encryption/decryption functions performed at each node (when
protecting the joint key Ks) consist of symmetric operations which can be based on standard
procedures like DES or AES. However, let us also consider the case where this operation is a
simple exclusive-OR (XOR) operation between Ks and Kj+. That is,
cj = Ks XOR Kj+; (3.3)
where cj is the ciphertext sent from Nj to Nj+1. Node Nj+1 then performs the following to
propagate Ks to Nj+2 (note that Nj and Nj+1 share the same key Kj+, and Nj+1 and Nj+2
share Kj+1 ),
Ks = cj XOR Kj+ XOR Kj+1 : (3.4)
As the nodes nally obtain Ks, it is noted that all pairwise DH keys can also be known to the
nodes in the group by simply applying XOR to Ks and all ciphertexts. A related question,
which raises a strategic consideration, is what kind of a threat can be posed by this procedure.
After all, if the members of the group nally know the joint secret key, Ks, they might as well
know the individual DH keys. This surely holds if the DH keys expire at the end of the session
that utilizes the key Ks.
A very important observation concerns the issue of propagating the group key via XOR
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operations, as mentioned above. It is imperative that key conrmation (as shown in section
2.5.2 and 2.5.3) will precede the actual propagation of the key. In other words, Nj will propagate
Ks by sending Ks XOR Ki+ only if the key conrmation between Nj and Nj+1 was successful.
If not, Nj must overcome the obstacle and create an immediate joint key with Nj+2, thereby
enabling the continuation of the chain (here we assume that N1; the rst node generating Ks,
is the cluster head and is not malicious). In these cases, whereby key conrmation is not
successful, (suggesting that Nj+1 might be malicious), the group key (Ks) will be propagated
along with the ID of the potentially malicious node. By the end of the distribution process,
the IDs of all potentially malicious nodes in the cluster will be known to the legitimate nodes
(holding the desired group key).
This ring-based topology group key establishment (presented in this section) can be signi-
cantly improved, ensuring higher fault tolerance. Various methods using other topologies, such
as a tree topology, have been published, [25], [38]. Chapter 4 in this dissertation describes an
improvement of this group key generation in terms of delay time, independent of the pairwise
key establishment described in section 3.1 and without the need of a specic topology.
3.2.2 Countering Possible Attacks
Several possible attacks, including Denial of Service (DoS) should be addressed. Two forms
of DoS attacks can occur impacting the e¤ectiveness of the o¤-loading framework. In the rst
type of DoS attacks, one or more malicious nodes, pretending to be nodes seeking assistance,
can continuously send requests to neighbors thereby draining their energy. In these cases, the
weight value generated at each node when receiving the request message can alleviate the DoS
attack, as the more o¤-load calculation requests a node receives, the more energy it will waste,
and consequently, the longer the waiting time will be. This results in lower possibility of being
served as the assistant node. A possible problem lays in the option that a malicious node can
alway try to o¤er help rst, and then will not. In this case the node will have to do all of the
calculations by himself.
The other type of DoS attacks can happen when the malicious nodes pretend to be the
assisting nodes by always generating the highest weight value and thus always responding the
quickest to request messages, and then returning incorrect calculation results. In these cases,
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however, the key conrmation process is inherently able to counter it. It is noted that following
the establishment of a shared key, key conrmation follows. That is, nodes Ni and Nj encrypt
and decrypt a test message to verify that they have the same key. If indeed the keys are
identical, both nodes can be trusted (i.e. each node can trust its counterpart). If Kij 6= Kji
then it is clear that either one (or both) of the assisting nodes was malicious, or that there was
an innocent error (for example due to link error). In both cases, if the key is not conrmed,
then the joint key needs to be re-established. Under the scenario where a group key needs to
be created, the two nodes that did not generate a joint key will be eliminated from the group.
3.3 Cryptocomplexity Analysis and Experimental Results
3.3.1 Cryptocomplexity Analysis
The unique nature of WSNs merits a brief discussion on cryptocomplexity. Let the term MIPS
denote million of instructions per second. We rely on the fact that one MIPS computer performs
about 240 elliptic curve additions per year, which translates to approximately 80 iterations per
second [41]. For a key of n bits, a rough estimation of the number of additions needed for
solving an elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), is 2n=2. Relying on the latter,
we present a cryptocomplexity summary of the key sizes discussed. Here we use 160-bit keys
(over a eld size of 163 bits).
Recent challenges for solving the ECDLP over a eld size of 109 have been issued [1]. In April
2004, the challenge was met and the ECDLP key was solved. The e¤ort involved four months
and 9,500 CPUs. In light of the fact that the time frame for the validity and condentiality of
WSNs data is typically in the order of at most days, ECC-based key generation o¤ers a high
level of security.
3.3.2 Energy Consumption and Pairwise Key-establishment Time
Implementations of the Key-establishment and measurements of energy consumption and time
have been measured on two di¤erent platforms, the TelosB [3] and the Intel Mote 2 [6], both
described below.
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Figure 3-3: Crossbow/UC-Berkeleys TelosB sensor platform
Implementations on the Crossbow, Inc. TelosB Platform
We have implemented the presented key establishment procedures on a TPR 2400CA TelosB
network sensor module [3], developed by the University of California, Berkeley, and manufac-
tured by Crossbow, Inc. The TelosB platforms microcontroller unit is a 16-bit MSP430, an
ultra low power controller manufactured by Texas Instruments, running at 4MHz and consum-
ing 1.8mA. The transmission rate is 250 kbps, consuming 19.5mA when the radio is active.
The unit draws a voltage of 3V. Two such motes were used in the experimental setup. One
originated the request for key exchange, transmitting the necessary information to the other,
while the other responded with the required calculations and transmitted back the data. The
same transmissions and calculations were symmetric with the second node as an initiator. For
the purpose of calculating the energy consumptions, all metrics were measured both for trans-
mitting and receiving data as well as for the computational component.
Given the variance that exists with regards to the communication needs associated with
each scheme, a brief discussion on the implications of the communication load is in order. From
a protocol stack perspective, the security layer can be viewed as part of the application layer.
The topic of media access control (MAC) protocol in WSNs has received much attention in
recent years, primarily due to its unique characteristics. When comparing results to other
schemes, this work views the issue of e¢ ciently accessing the media (i.e. balancing sleep and
active transmission/reception periods) as the responsibility of the MAC layer. For that reason,
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Table 3.1: Time and energy consumptions for scalar-point multiplication and radio transmission
on the TelosB sensor platform
Scalar Point Multiplication
EccM
Time (seconds) Voltage (v) Current (mA) Energy (mJ)
32.5 3 1.8 184
TinyEcc
Time (seconds) Voltage (v) Current (mA) Energy (mJ)
16 3 1.8 76
Radio Transmission (including a 7 byte header)
Time (msec) Energy (mJ)
~15 0.038
the analysis is driven by measurements reecting the consumption of the security layer and do
not consider ine¢ ciencies (i.e. periods of unnecessary "active" periods) introduced by the MAC
layer. This is a valid perspective given that all security protocols rely on e¢ cient MAC layer
functionality.
The ECC key sizes used in our measurements is 160 bits. Its cryptographic complexity is,
equivalent to that of 1024-bit RSA. As discussed previously, both these values are specied
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Computer Security Resource
Center [26]. EccM, the original code provided by Malan et al. [45] , which was designed for
the 8-bit MICA2 mote [2], was revised and optimized for TelosB implementation (see gure
3-3). Modications to the code were carried out in order to exploit the 16-bit based opera-
tions supported by the MSP430. The revised code yielded execution of an ECC scalar-point
multiplication in 32.5 seconds for 160-bit keys. Memory needs were about 20Kbytes of ROM
and 1500 bytes of RAM. These self-certied algorithms (both xed and ephemeral) were also
implemented using functions taken from the TinyECC package [49]. In this case the results
were even more encouraging. The code yielded execution of an ECC scalar-point multiplication
in only 14 seconds for 160-bit keys.
Table 3.2 describes the time and energy consumption for scalar-point multiplication and
radio transmission on the Crossbow/UC-Berkeleys TelosB sensor platform (using a eld size of
163 bits). Note that the actual time the radio is in use is greater than 15 msec (since it takes
time to also power up and power down). Calculations have been done using both the EccM
code and the TinyEcc code.
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Table 3.2: The time computed for establishing an online pairwise xed and ephemeral key on
the TelosB sensor platform
Key type Number of online exponentiations Calculation time (seconds)
Fixed key- EccM 1-calculated by a node in the cluster 34
0-o­ oaded 0
Fixed key- TinyEcc 1-calculated by a node in the cluster 18
0-o­ oaded 0
Ephemeral key- EccM 1-calculated by a node in the cluster 34
1-o­ oaded 34
Ephemeral key- TinyEcc 1-calculated by a node in the cluster 18
1-o­ oaded 18
Clearly, for the same key size, the energy consumed by radio transmission is three orders
of magnitude lower than the energy consumed by calculating a scalar-point multiplication.
That is, the transmission overhead is negligible compared to the computational e¤orts, strongly
advocating the o¤-loading approach pursued in this section.
As indicated above, a node in a cluster needs to execute one exponentiation in order to
perform both online xed and ephemeral key-establishments (whereby in the latter, a second
online calculation is o¤-loaded to a neighboring node).
In the model considered, a node is either part of the cluster or an assisting node. Hence,
assisting nodes do not take part in active information gathering and collaborative data process-
ing. Moreover, a node will only assist a single other node at any given time. To that end, the
overall gain achieved in the cluster by performing o¤-loading for a single pair of nodes is linear
with respect to the number of key pairs established.
Table 3.2 describes the time for establishing an online pairwise xed and ephemeral key on
the Crossbow/UC-Berkeleys TelosB sensor platform (using a eld size of 163 bits). See gure
3-4 for self-certied time requirements for TelosB using the TinyEcc code.
Since using a smaller eld size is certainly germane to WSN applications, the time consumed
for these calculations can be further decreased.
Implementation on the Intel Mote 2 Platform
The methodologies for self-certied key generations developed here were also implemented on
the Intel Mote 2 [6] platform (see gure 3-5). This recently o¤ered high-end, low power module
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Figure 3-4: Self-certied key generation timing requirements for the TelosB mote
employs the Intel PXA271 XScale Processor running at a clock frequency ranging from 13
MHz to 416 MHz (in contrast to the telosB motes where the only frequency is 4 MHz) The
core frequency can be dynamically set in software, allowing the designer to carefully adjust
the timing/power trade-o¤ so as to optimize performance of a particular application. The
self-certied algorithms (both xed and ephemeral) were again implemented using functions
taken from the TinyECC package [49]. The original code provided by Malan et al. [45], which
was designed for the 8-bit MICA2 mote [2], was revised and optimized for the Intel Mote
2 implementation. This package provided a basic library of ECC-based functions, including
scalar multiplication and exponentiation operations. Customizations for the XScale processor,
including 32-bit operation optimizations were carried out. In addition, supplementary functions,
such as e¢ cient Montgomery arithmetic were added. Nodes exchanged messages using a 2.4
GHz, IEEE 802.15.4 compliant, low-power radio transceiver.
The ECC key size used in the measurements was 160 bits, the cryptographic complexity
of which is equivalent to that of 1024-bit RSA (as indicated above). The results were very
encouraging: at a frequency of 312 MHz, the process of scalar-point multiplication required
only 45 msec, while consuming only 24 mJ. It is observed that while the time it takes to
perform the entire key generation process scales linearly with regard to the clock frequency,
the energy does not. A strong advantage was observed for operating at higher frequencies. At
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Time (msec) Voltage (v) Current (mA) Energy (mJ)
190 3.8 137 99
TinyEcc
Time (msec) Voltage (v) Current (mA) Energy (mJ)
42 3.8 137 22
Radio Transmission (including a 7 byte header)
Time (msec) Energy (mJ)
~15 0.127
a frequency of 312 MHz, for example, xed-key generation can thus be achieved in less than
50 msec, consuming approximately 25 mJ (including all communication overheads). These
surprising results clearly pave the way for broader development of resource-e¢ cient security
mechanisms for wireless sensor networks. Moreover, it should be noted that since using a
smaller eld size is certainly germane to sensor network applications, the time consumed for
these calculations can be further reduced.
Table 3.3 describes the time and energy consumption for scalar-point multiplication on the
Intel2 sensor platform (using a eld size of 163 bits) on a 312 MHz clock. Both implementations
on the EccM and TinyEcc are indicated.
Comparison between the two platforms As can be observed form the previous two sec-
tions, the performance achieved for point-by-scalar multiplication using the Intel Mote 2 is
signicantly higher than that of the TelosB motes, in terms of both time and energy consump-
tion. While Malans code [45] demonstrated very interesting results, a more e¢ cient code was
that of the TinyECC package [49]. Table 3.4 summarizes the primary measurements obtained.
To provide a reference point for the computational e¤ort in performing point-by-scalar
multiplication on the Intel Mote 2 node, listening over the radio for one second requires ap-
proximately 57 mJ. One of the very powerful attributes of the Intel mote 2 relates to the fact
its Intel PXA271 XScale processor can operate at a clock frequency ranging from 13 MHz to
416 MHz. The clock frequency can be determined dynamically (i.e. in run-time) in software.
This o¤ers great exibility to the designer in terms of controlling the power consumption at
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Figure 3-5: The Intel Mote 2 sensor platform
Table 3.4: Point by scalar timing and energy requirements. TinyECC measurements are pro-




Computation time 16 s 42 ms
Estimated energy 76 mJ 22 mJ
Radio transmission
Computation time ~15 msec ~15 msec


























Figure 3-6: Energy consumption for self-certied key generations on TelosB and Intel Mote 2
platforms
any given time. The TelosB, on the other hand, only runs at a frequency of 4 MHz. We can
see that the time it takes to calculate a point-by-scalar multiplication using the Intel mote
2 is three orders of a magnitude shorter than the time it takes to calculate a point-by-scalar
multiplication using the TelosB (when using the same TinyEcc package). These results are very
encouraging and justify the claim that ECC can be implemented on WSNs. Figure 3-6 depicts
the total energy consumed while establishing a 160-bit key for both platforms.
The reason for the reduced power consumption with the increase in clock frequency on
the Intel mote 2 can be explained as follows. The XScale processor, as any other processor,
has xed peripheral modules that consume constant power. These include timers, interrupt
controller, bus arbitration unit, etc. The interrupt controller, for example, continues to operate
at a frequency of approximately 4 MHz, regardless of the base CPU frequency selected. To
that end, let PCPU denote the xed power (i.e. frequency independent) consumed by these
peripheral processor units. We then let Pb represent the power consumed by the processing of
the PKC related functions. If we dene tPKC = f as the time consumed by the PKC process,





Figure 3-7: A simplied network model demonstrating the e¢ ciency of the o­ oading approach
which a¤ects the network lifetime
given by
ETOTAL = ECPU + EPKC(f) =

f
PCPU + Pb; (3.5)
which explains the convex curves observed in gure 3-6
3.3.3 Performance Gain Toward Network Lifetime
Next, we consider the implications of the o¤-loading approach to the overall network lifetime.
The latter is measured from the instant the network becomes active until the rst node runs out
of power. Although the o¤-loading approach has proven to save computation time and energy
consumption for a pair of nodes establishing the shared key, during the o¤-loading process,
extra communication energy is also consumed. Therefore, analyzing the o¤-loading approach
to the overall network performance and network lifetime is an appropriate performance metric.
We shall refer to a simplied network model (gure 3-7) to demonstrate the e¢ ciency of the
o¤-loading approach a¤ecting network lifetime.
The model consists of two non-overlapping clusters of nodes, each of which have a cluster
head. Let us assume that the two cluster heads exchange keys regularly as means of establishing
secure links facilitating the exchange of condential information. Let us further assume that
each of the cluster heads is aided by a (possibly di¤erent) node, who is a member of the
respective cluster. Since all nodes compute at least as much as the cluster heads, it is apparent
that the network lifetime is determined by the lifetime of the head nodes
In order to understand the performance gain on each of the sensor node platforms used,
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there is a need to dene a few basic parameters:
tcomp - the time it takes to perform the calculation of a point-by-scalar multiplication
tcomm - the time it takes to transfer or receive the keys
N1 - the number of keys that can be generated by a single node without o¤-loading
N2 - denotes the number of keys that can be generated by a single node with o¤-loading
Ecomm - the energy consumed when communicating (i.e. exchanging a packet)
Ecomp - the energy consumed in computing a point-by-scalar multiplication
EB - the initial battery energy of each node





since each node performs two exponentiations. For the second case, when o¤-loading is em-





since each node performs only one exponentiation, but is required to transmit and receive a
packet, identical in length to the length of a key.
In order to derive a metric for the network lifetime, we shall assume that on average the
application requires that  keys be generated each hour. A reasonable value for  can be, for
example, twelve which represents the scenario that on average every ve minutes a new key is
required. Consequently, the network lifetime for the case of no o¤-loading is N1= while for the
case that o¤-loading is utilized it is N2=.
Technical specications of the TelosB and Intel mote 2 platforms
The TelosB platform is powered by two AA batteries in series operating nominally at 3V,
o¤ering approximately EB = 9; 500 J [27]. Based on the timing and current measurements
summarized in table 3.1, for the TelosB platform, the energy consumed in calculating a single
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exponentiation and transmitting a key is, respectively,
Ecomm = 19:5 mAh 3V  tcomm (3.8)
Ecomp = 1:8 mAh 3V  tcomp
On the Intel mote 2 platform the same considerations apply, whereby performance gain
depends on the processor clock frequency (ranging from 13 MHz to 416 MHz). Here, we
have chosen to concentrate on the 312 MHz option, since it yields the lowest total energy
consumption. Three AAA batteries were assumed (o¤ering approximately 4000 J) and a voltage
of 4.4V is drawn.
Network Lifetime
Figure 3-8 illustrates the expected node lifetime for both TelosB and Intel 2 motes. The
assumption is that the cryptographic process consumes 20% of the computational e¤ort involved
when an event occurs. As can be seen, as the average interval separating two consecutive key
generations grow, the nodes lifetime increases as well. Since the network lifetime is dened as
the time it takes for the rst node to run out of battery, then these gures reveal the networks
lifetime as well. Since the energy consumed while calculating a point-by-scalar multiplication is
signicantly lower in the Intel mote 2 than the energy consumed while calculating a point-by-
scalar multiplication on the TelosB motes, the networks life time when using the Intel motes
2 is signicantly higher. All calculations here have been done according to the protocol of
establishing a self-certied ephemeral key without o¤-loading (i.e. each node calculates two
scalar by point multiplications). While o¤-loading signicantly decreases the time it takes for
a node to calculate an ephemeral key, using the o¤-loading procedure does not improve the
networks lifetime since, on average, all nodes would have done the core one multiplication for
themselves and assisted with the o¤-loading for another node in need (increasing the number
of multiplications calculated to two). Although the total energy consumed by the o¤-loading
technique is a bit higher due to the communication overhead, such energy consumption is
distributed across multiple nodes. This results in a longer network lifetime, since it takes
longer, on average, for the rst node to run out of energy.
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Figure 3-8: Node life time as a function of ephemeral key-generation frequency, assuming 160-bit
keys
3.4 Network Lifetime Simulations
In order to obtain a coarse assessment of the impact of o¤-loading computations on the network
lifetime, a Matlab simulation platform was employed. The simulated environment consisted of a
NN grid in whichM nodes were uniformly deployed. Each node has a transmission radius, rt,
and a sensitivity (to event being monitored) radius, rs. All nodes are assumed to have a battery
source with capacity Ebat (J). Based on the energy consumption gures described in previous
sections, each transmission, reception and computation event reduced the battery energy by
their respective amounts. Events occur randomly across the grid, whereby each is assumed to
be static for a period of time su¢ cient for a cluster of nodes to sense it and act accordingly.
Each node, upon sensing the event, attempts to establish a key with two other nodes in the
cluster, as part of the group key establishment process. Should an assisting node be available
(i.e. a node that is not part of the sensing cluster but is close enough to the node requesting
assistance), it shares the computational load. It is further assumed that the collaborative signal
and information processing that is carried out, following the key establishment phase, requires
p times more energy than the key generation did. All nodes that sense the event are included
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Figure 3-9: Network lifetime as a function of the node density
in the active cluster.
The goal of the simulation is to assess the impact of the o¤-loading scheme on the overall
network lifetime. Each simulation iteration is executed until the rst node runs out of battery,
so as to be consistent with the denition of a network lifetime. Assuming that on average 30
minutes separate two consecutive events, and that N = 300; rs = 80; rt = 50; Ebat = 2000J ,
gure 3-9, depicts the network lifetime (in days) as a function of the number of nodes (M)
deployed. Naturally, as the node density increases, so does the probability that an event will
be sensed, thereby incurring energy consumption for both communications and computations.
That suggests a negative impact on the network lifetime. However, higher node densities
increase the probability that assisting nodes will be found for o¤-loading computations. This
helps distribute the energy-consumption, thus increasing network lifetime.
As can be observed from gure 3-9, the o¤-loading procedure increases the networks lifetime
It is also clear that with or without o­ oading, for a denser network, the lifetime decreases. This
is due to the fact that since the network is more dense, an event is sensed by more nodes (which
improves the accuracy of the monitoring process as a whole), and more assisting nodes are called
upon. The impact of o¤-loading results in an increase of about 20% in network lifetime, which
is a highly desirable property. In addition to the increase in network lifetime, it is important
to note that the main attribute of o¤-loading is reduction in the time it takes to establish the
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Figure 3-10: Network lifetime as a function of the transmission radius
secret key (since nodes operate in parallel). Moreover, we see that even for a small number
of nodes, utilizing the o¤-loading scheme results in a longer lifetime, primarily due to the fact
that any o¤-loading is better than none.
When the network lifetime was studied as a function of node transmission radius (see gure
3-9), it appeared that beyond a certain transmission range, the network lifetime increased
(insignicantly). This can be contributed to the fact that the larger the transmission radius
is, the more assisting nodes that can be found. Figure 3-10 depicts the results for the same
parameters as in gure 3-9, with N = 64. For both gures 3-9 and 3-10, 30 runs were performed
in each operation condition, with results reected by the error graphs.
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Chapter 4
Delay-E¢ cient Group Key
Generation
A pivotal theme in this dissertation pertains to authentication aspects of key-generation tech-
niques in WSNs, with an emphasis on e¢ ciency and energy preservation. The group key
generation scheme presented in section 3.2.1 is based on pairwise communication and as such
carries an inherent drawback of substantial process delay. The latter impacts the time it takes
to establish a group key from the instant that the process begins until its completion. This
group key generation schemes nal stage of the process, which comprises the exchange and val-
idation of the secret key to be used, introduces latency that is linear with respect to the number
of nodes in the cluster. This is true for all schemes that are based on pair-wise exchange of
information and prohibits the overall scalability key generation framework. To address this
key issue, this chapter describes a more delay-e¢ cient key generation scheme that is much less
dependent on the particular topology of the cluster.
We begin by asserting that fully-certied key generation procedures are comprised of the
following three generic steps:
1. Verifying the authenticity of userspublic keys by validating their associated certicates.
Here the validator is assured that a submitted public key corresponds to the ID of the
user that claims to be the owner of the key. Such validation is achieved via reference to
the CAs public key.
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2. Verifying the authenticity of the exchanged ephemeral values. This is based on referring
to the users public key, whose authenticity was veried in the preceding step.
3. Generating the session key, based on the ephemeral values veried in Step 2.
Various group-key generation procedures and their associated authentication schemes have
been proposed in recent literature ([36], [12], [25], [43]). These works are based on distinctly
performing all three steps described. Here, a novel group-key generation is treated, unrelated to
the group-key generation procedures presented in the references provided. This method devises
a complete group-key generation procedure in which steps 2 and 3 above are joined into one
mathematical operation. Step 1 is assumed to be independently performed prior to each cluster
formation event. It will be shown that the contribution of this new procedure does not concern
savings in computational e¤orts, but rather ease of management and a substantial reduction in
the overall time consumed by the key generation process.
4.1 Introductory Remarks
In order to understand the rationale behind the group key generation procedure presented in
this chapter, we must rst look at three di¤erent procedures. The rst is the Burmester and
Desmedt (BD) algorithm [13], [14], which treats step 3 alone by establishing a group key. The
second is the Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (MQV) [65] key generation procedure, which treats steps
2 and 3 in one algorithm. The third is the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [34] signature
generation and verication, pertaining to steps 1 and 2 independently.
All three procedures are performed over the eld GF (p), where the private key and the
public key of node i (if used) are xi and Yi, respectively, where Yi = Gxi mod p; and G
pertains to a primitive element in the eld. All bold notations represent a point on the elliptic
curve, assuming one chooses to work under the eld GF (2n). We next review these fundamental
procedures as a prelude to the core contribution.
4.1.1 The Burmester and Desmedt (BD) Group-key Generation
The BD group-key generation procedure comprises of the following steps:
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a. Each Useri; i = 1; 2; 3; : : : ; n; generates Zi = Gri mod p; for a randomly selected 1 < ri <
p  1.
b. The value Zi is broadcasted.
c. Each Useri then calculates and broadcasts Vi = [(Zi+1)=(Zi 1)]ri mod p, where the
indices are taken modulo n.
e. Key generation: each Useri computes the key
Ki = (Zi 1)
nri  (Vi)n 1  (Vi+1)n 2  (Vi+2)n 3   Vi 2: (4.1)
As a result, all users end up with the same joint session-key
K = Grnrn 1+rn 1rn 2+:::+r2r1+r1rn (4.2)
This is based on observing that
Vi = [(Zi+1)=(Zi 1)]
ri = Gri+1ri riri 1modp (4.3)
and
Ki = (Zi 1)
nri  (Vi)n 1  (Vi+1)n 2  (Vi+2)n 3   Vi 2 = Gwmod p; (4.4)
where
w = nriri 1 + (n  1)(ri+1ri   riri 1) + (4.5)
(n  2)(ri+2ri+1   ri+1ri) + :::
+(ri 1ri 2   ri 2ri 3)
= riri 1 + ri+1ri + ri+2ri+1 + :::+ ri 1ri 2:
The generation of each of the values Zi; Vi; Ki requires one modular exponentiation. To
explicitly clarify, the long multiplication associated with the generation of Ki is of computa-
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tional complexity equivalent to two modular exponentiations. This is shown in [14]. Since
this procedure concerns only step 3 (generating the session-key, based on the ephemeral values
veried in Step 2), authenticity of the ephemeral values Zi is assumed. That is, Zi is provably
associated with an identied Useri. The original presentations of the BD scheme did not treat
the issue of authenticating Zi, which is next addressed.
4.1.2 The Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (MQV) Key Generation
The MQV key generation procedure [65], combines step 2 and step 3, without the execution of
step 1. Let zi denote the scalar presentation of the element Zi. If Zi is an element of GF (p)
then in practice it can also be considered as a scalar zi, when needed. If Zi is a point on an
elliptic curve, i.e. an element in the eld GF (2n), zi can be the x-coordinate of Zi. The MQV
procedure takes the following steps:
a. Useri and Userj respectively calculate Zi = Gri mod p and Zj = Grj mod p for randomly
selected ri and rj .
b. Useri sends Yi and Zi to Userj ; Userj sends Yj and Zj to Useri.
c. Useri and Userj respectively calculate Ki = (Zj Y
zj
j )
(ri+zixi) mod p and Kj = (Zi
Y zii )(rj+zjxj) mod p; which is their joint session-key. The value of the generated joint
session-key is G(ri+zixi)(rj+zjxj) mod p
d. Key conrmation: conrm thatKi = Kj . Conrming the validity of the exchanged values
is based on explicit certication. Here, Yi and Yj are validated based on executing Step
1 described before.
The advantage of MQV lies in the fact that the validity of the ephemeral values Zi, Zj does
not have to be established by itself. Instead, Steps 2 and 3 are combined into a single step.
4.1.3 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
The DSA procedure [34] can be used for signature generation as well as signature verication
(which are an inherent part of steps 1 and 2). The following are the two procedures.
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DSA signature generation
The signer, Useri, generates a signature based on his knowledge of the private key xi. Any
party is then able to verify Useris signature by referring to the public key Yi = Gxi mod p.
Here: q is a prime divisor of (p   1). T =W((p 1))=q mod p, for any 1 <W < (p   1) such
that W((p 1))=q mod p > 1. In the lines of DSA specications, Useri signs a message m by
generating a random 0 < k < p  1 and calculating
L = (Tkmodp)modq and s = (k 1(H(m) + xi  L))modq; (4.6)
where H(m) is a hash of m and L is a scalar representation of L. The signature is the pair
fL; sg, submitted together with m.
DSA signature verication
Let m0;L0 and s0 denote the received versions of m;L and s; respectively. To verify the authen-
ticity of m0 (i.e., establish the fact that m0 = m), the verier calculates:
w = (s0) 1 mod q
u1 = H(m0)  w mod q
u2 = L0  w mod q
(*) V = (Tu1 Yu2i mod p) mod q.
If V = L0 then the signature is veried. That is, this step provides a yes or no answer
regarding the validity of m.
4.2 The Combined BD-MQV Group Key Generation
The procedure presented next is proposed to address latency in group-key generation for WSNs.
It concerns joining Steps 2 and 3 within a group-key generation framework. The suggested
procedure takes the following steps:
a. Useri, i = 1; 2; 3; : : : ; n, generates Zi = Gri mod p, for a randomly selected 1 < ri < p 1.
b. Each Useri broadcasts Yi and Zi.
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where, as before, xi and Yi = Gxi mod p are the private and public keys of Useri.
d. Key generation: Useri computes the key
Ki = (Zi 1Yi 1
zi 1)n(ri+zixi)  (Vi)n 1  (Vi+1)n 2  (Vi+2)n 3:::Vi 2: (4.8)
All users end up with the same key, having the form Gvmod p, where
v = n(ri 1 + xi 1zi 1)(ri + zixi)+
+(n  1)(ri + zixi)(ri+1 + xi+1zi+1   ri 1   xi 1zi 1)+
+ (n  2)(ri+1 + zi+1xi+1)(ri+2 + xi+2zi+2   ri   xizi) + :::
+(ri 2 + zi 2xi 2)(ri 1 + xi 1zi 1   ri 3   xi 3zi 3)
= (rn + znxn)(rn 1 + zn 1xn 1)+
+ (rn 1 + zn 1xn 1)(rn 2 + zn 2xn 2) + : : :
+(r1 + z1x1)(rn + znxn)mod (p  1)
For n = 2, K = G2(r1+z1x1)(r2+z2x2) mod p, which is the (squared) MQV key, with similar
security considerations
e. Key conrmation: We note that if Useri does not know log Yi (i.e., it does not know xi
such that Yi = Gxi mod p), the chained procedure under which all Ki end up the same
fails, and hence each user ends up with a di¤erent key. Conrming that the users share
the same key proves that all users know and have used the log of their certied public
keys, which is the essence of discrete-log-based authentication.
Similar to the general MQV case, the procedure presented above is semi-self-certied. That
is, steps 2-3 are combined into one step, but unlike fully self-certied procedure, step 1 is still
performed independently.
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A note on group-wise key-conrmation: Step (e) above concerns key-conrmation, whereby
all parties of the group are to be convinced that they share the same key. In practice, an
implicit key conrmation is recommended in such cases. That is, the group members skip step
(e) and start communicating using their shared key. Only parties that have the correct key will
be able to correctly encrypt/decrypt messages, and there is no need for explicit preliminary key
conrmation step.
The calculation of Vi in this combined BD-MQV procedure requires three exponentiations,
compared to one exponentiation in the original BD procedure. Since in the latter there is also a
need to verify the authenticity of the exchanged ephemeral values, a comparison with the num-
ber of exponentiations in the DSA procedure is relevant. These extra two exponentiations are
equivalent in complexity to a discrete-log-based signature verication, as described in subsec-
tion 4.1.3 by the marked (*) in the DSA verication procedure. The calculation of Ki requires
two exponentiations, as in the original BD procedure. Since in the latter, there is also a need
to verify the authenticity of the exchanged ephemeral values, we must also take into account
the extra exponentiation in the signature generation operation as described in subsection 4.1.3
by eq. (4.6) in the DSA generation procedure. Altogether, executing the combined BD-MQV
procedure requires ve exponentiations, whereas in the original BD procedure along with the
needed DSA procedure there are six.
Executing an independent signature generation/verication procedure performed when val-
idating ephemeral values (like in the DSA procedure) is not necessary in this group key gen-
eration. This also introduces signicant savings in management overhead. The original BD
scheme does not treat the need to validate the authenticity of the transmitted Zi, as described
in step 3. This overhead is omitted in the proposed procedure. However, as in the case of the
original BD, the procedure necessitates the computational overhead of executing step 1
We next compare the di¤erent performance metrics of the pairwise key generation scheme
described in chapter 3 with the combined BD-MQV scheme, as summarized in table 4.1. In the
case of operating over the eld of GF (2n), every exponentiation is substituted by a point-by-
scalar multiplication. When examining the procedure one notes that there are six multiplica-
tions involved: one for step a, three for step c and two for step d. When adding the use of DSA
for verifying the authenticity of userspublic keys, the signature verication step necessitates
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two extra multiplications. Altogether, each node is required to perform eight multiplications.
When comparing this procedure to the ephemeral procedure presented in chapter 3, we notice
that in the ephemeral self-certied method there are only six multiplications involved.
The next criterion to be examined is the total number of value transmissions and receptions
involved in each protocol. The pairwise-based scheme requires each node to transmit three
values to its neighbors in the ring topology. Correspondingly, each node receives 6 values from
its neighbors (while three of them are recieved at the time of the other nodes transmission),
bringing the total number of values exchanged thus far to 6. This pertains to the key estab-
lishment phase, however another message is received and transmitted by each node during the
propagation of the secret key. This brings the total number of values exchanged in the network
to 8N . In the combined BD-MQV scheme, each node performs 3 transmissions, correspond-
ing to Yi and Zi and Vi; and receives 3(N   1) values. Given that the BD-MQV protocol is
broadcast-based, the total number of transmissions is 3N .
When comparing the total process latency, however, there are signicant di¤erences between
the two approaches. Let tmult and tcomm denote the time consumed by a multiplication and
either a value transmission or reception, respectively. As can be seen in table 4.1, neglecting the
time consumed by the multiplications, which are independent of the network size, the latency
in the case of BD-MQV is 37.5% (3/8) of that of the pairwise scheme. This is a substantial
gain in terms of the overall process delay.
Naturally, expediting the process comes at a cost; in our case, energy cost. We dene emult
and ecomm as the energy consumed by a single multiplication and a single transmission/reception
event, respectively. While the pairwise scheme requires (11N) ecomm+(4N) emult, each node in
the BD-MQV case transmits 3 values and receives 3(N 1) values (from the other N 1 nodes in
the network), which translates to 3N2 overall message exchanges. This is indeed a considerable
energy cost to pay for a speedup gain, however in some applications such a trade-o¤ may be
viewed as acceptable.
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Table 4.1: Performance comparison between the pairwise key generation scheme and the com-
bined BD-MQV method.
Performance metric Pairwise Combined BD-MQV
Multiplications 4N + 2N (a priori) 6N + 2N (a priori)
Transmission/receptions time (8N) tcomm (3N) tcomm




ecomm + (6N) emult
Process total latency (8N) tcomm + 4tmult (3N) tcomm + 6tmult
4.3 Network Lifetime Simulations
As indicated above, each of the N nodes in a cluster is required to perform 3N modular
exponentiations as well as receive N   1 messages from other nodes that have broadcasted
their respective information. The simulation setup consisted of a 1000 ft.  1000 ft. virtual
area over which 300 nodes were randomly deployed. These nodes have a sensing radius that
ranges between 50 to 300 ft. We further assume that each node has 5000 J of battery energy,
which is approximately the capacity of a AAA battery. In an e¤ort to obtain a coarse network
lifetime indication, two scenarios were considered: in the rst, events occur randomly across
the area of interest; in the second, events were generated along random linear trajectories,
representing, for example, a path of vehicle motion across a eld of interest. Figures 4-1 and
4-2 illustrate a deployment setup of 300 nodes with linear trajectories and randomly occurring
events, respectively.
Figure 4-3 depicts the network lifetime estimate as a function of the sensing radius. Each
point on the graph is an average over 1000 trials. Events are assumed to occur on average (in
both scenarios) once every hour. Up to 20 nodes are assumed to be included in a cluster that
is monitoring an event of interest. As such, if an event is sensed by more than 20 nodes, the
rest are assumed inactive in the context of that particular event. Moreover, the data security
portion is assumed to constitute 10% of the overall code running on the node. This appears
reasonable given the complexity of current WSN applications. We note from the results that as
the sensing radius increases, the network lifetime reaches an asymptotic value in both scenarios.
This can be explained by the fact that as the sensing radius increases so does the probability of
a node participating in the cluster that forms around an event. As a result, it will take a shorter
amount of time for one of the nodes to run out of energy. It is also noted that when events
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Figure 4-1: An illustration of a 1000 ft  1000 ft area with 300 randomly deployed nodes
(circles) and linear trajectories of events (xsymbols).
are correlated in time, as is the case with the second scenario, the network lifetime decreases.
This can be intuitively appreciated since individual nodes have a higher probability of being
activated several consecutive times as they overlap with the path of a given trajectory, thus
concentrating the energy consumption on a smaller set of nodes yielding a lower overall network
lifetime.
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Figure 4-2: An illustration of a 1000 ft  1000 ft area with 300 randomly deployed nodes
(circles) and random events (xsymbols)

























Figure 4-3: Network lifetime for the BD-MQV method as a function of the sensing range. The
security portion of the code is assumed to be 10% of the overall computational load.
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Chapter 5
Countering Denial of Service (DoS)
Attacks
A fundamental requisite for security, other than providing data condentiality and authenti-
cation, is Denial of Service (DoS) mitigation. However, the computational e¤ort involved in
performing PKC operations remains substantial. From an energy consumption perspective, it
is imperative that the processing and communication resources be utilized only when required.
To that end, PKC implementations are more vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
when compared to traditional security methods that require less resources. In particular, if a
malicious party attacks a sensor node by repetitive requests to establish a key, the resources of
the attacked node can be exhausted quite rapidly. Combatting DoS attacks is the last frontier
to be conquered prior to making PKC deployment standard security practice in sensor networks.
This chapter focuses on a public key cryptographic approach for mitigating the impact of
DoS attacks in WSNs. The proposed novel RSA-based framework for combating DoS attacks
ensures that the malicious party will exhaust its resources prior to exhausting those of its
counterparts. In particular, the computational asymmetry in RSA signature generation schemes
is exploited to yield a resource-e¢ cient authentication mechanism which helps overcome DoS
attacks. Three methodologies for establishing an ephemeral key are presented in this context,
in which the proposed DoS mitigation mechanism is an embedded component. Implementation
results on the Intel Mote 2 platform substantiate the clear advantages of the proposed method.
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Part A:
Alice proving to Bob her validity
A relatively energy draining procedure on Trudy ’s side
Part B:
Bob proving to Alice his validity
A relatively non energy draining procedure on Bob’s
side
Stage A:




his validity to Alice
 r l ti l  low
part
If successful: both users hold an
ephemeral shared secret key
Figure 5-1: The proposed procedure for Denial of Service (DoS) prevention and ephemeral
key-generation.
5.1 Outline of the Proposed DoS Mitigation Procedure
The procedures for key generation described in sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 do not include any
mechanism for DoS mitigation. The DoS attack considered would easily occur when a malicious
node repeatedly approaches legitimate nodes requesting the establishment of a joint secret key.
The energy consumed by the legitimate nodes in the process of key generation is substantial.
Therefore, such an attack strategy can drain their energy. An e¢ cient DoS mechanism should
be able to prevent such attacks. The proposed DoS mitigation approach has two complementing
parts. The rst pertains to the instigator, Alice, who has to prove her validity to Bob, the party
(node) approached. The second part, which takes e¤ect only if Alice has indeed proven her
validity, pertains to Bob, who is required to prove his validity to Alice. We will demonstrate
that if the two procedures are successful, i.e., the identities of both Alice and Bob are validated,
then an ephemeral key can be issued. The latter implies that each time a certain legitimate
node wishes to establish a key with a neighboring node, not only is a DoS attack prevented,
but a di¤erent secret key will be generated. Figure 5-1 provides an illustration of the proposed
framework.
We shall refer to the following notations in the context of the proposed DoS mitigation
scheme:
 ni  ! user is public key
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 di  ! user is private key
 CRi  ! user is (CA issued) certicate
 IDi  ! user is public key identication
Notice that in sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3, where ECC based self-certied keys were established,
the private key, xi, was a scalar and the public key,Ui, was a point on the elliptic curve, whereas
in the scenario of DoS mitigation depicted here, both ni and di are scalars of the same length.
The latter are RSA related parameters.
The following sections describe, in detail, the two stages of the DoS mitigation method.
5.1.1 The Instigator Node Proving Its Validity
The specic scenario described in this case pertains to a malicious node that is attempting to
drain the energy of a trusted nodes. The rst step of a key establishment protocol consists
of an instigator node (Alice) initiating communications with another node (Bob). We shall
refer to the instigating node as a suspicious node that is required to prove its identity. We
thus expect that during the rst stage of the key exchange process, the majority of the energy
consumed will be on Alices part. This would mean that if a DoS attack is carried out, whereby
a malicious node repeatedly attempts to generate a key with a valid node, the latter will be
required to use as little energy as possible. We must assume that most of the nodes are not
jeopardized; hence the instigating nodes are to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. In
other words, the amount of energy drained from Alice will be signicant, yet not too high so
as to not deplete her battery too fast. However, if Alice is malicious, and attempts to establish
keys with various nodes, she will eventually run out of energy and /or expose her malicious
nature.
The method described next is based on the notion of key transport [29] using RSA [60]
with e = 3. We note that e = 3 is considered su¢ ciently secure [35]. The following four steps
constitute an ephemeral key exchange procedure that embeds the DoS mitigation mechanism:
Step 1 - Alice sends Bob her public key, nA; her identication, IDA; and her certicate
(issued by the CA), CRA: The certicate is the CAs signature on the association between nA
and IDA: An example for such an association can be: nAIDA  H(nA; IDA): Note that IDA
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can be a small number; nA can be 1024 bits (as in the protocol used here), hence H(nA; IDA)
depends on the length of nA: In this case, CRA = [H(nA; IDA)]
dCA modnCA: Naturally, only
the CA can create the CRA by using its private key dCA:




= H(nA; IDA): If the latter holds, Bob knows that nA and IDA are undeniably connected.
Since e = 3; this step requires Bob to compute only two modular multiplications [48]. If indeed
(CRA)
3modnCA = H(nA; IDA); Bob can then continue with generating a message m (it will
later be shown how this message is utilized as part of the key generation process), compute
t = memodnA and transmit t to Alice. Again, since e = 3; Bob has to calculate only 2
modular multiplications at this step.
Step 3 - Alice needs to prove that she indeed possesses the private key dA, proving to her
counterpart that her identity is valid. This is true since the CA would have given this private
key only to her. Let sx denote the number of bits in x, the least signicant section of m. Alice
needs to calculate tdA modnA = m and send Bob x: Message m is comprised out of n bits such
that n >> sx. The rest of the bits in the message will be used for the ephemeral key generation,
as will later be described.
It should be noted that, in contrast to Bob, Alice has to perform a computationally heavy
task as dA typically consists of either 512 or 1024 bits. To that end, the approach proposed
shifts the computational burden on the instigating node.
Step 4 - Bob compares the binary vector x he receives from Alice with the sx least signicant
bits inm. If these are identical he determines that Alices identity is valid. If not, he asserts that
Alice is malicious and terminates the key establishment process. In this case Bob performed
merely four modular multiplications, two receptions and 1 transmission.
The above process has achieved several key goals. First, the instigating node (Alice) uses
more energy than the approached node (Bob) as she calculates tdA modnA: Yet this is an
accepted burden under the assumption that the calculation of tdA modnA is performed only
once per key generation. Second, if Alice is malicious and attempts to instigate key generation
with more than one node, calculating tdA modnA for various types of t0s (di¤erent from one
correspondent to another) will drain her energy. Third, if the same IDA is used over and over







x  LSB of message m
compares
(CRA)
3 mod nCA =? H(nA, IDA)
If so, generates a message, m,
such that:
t=m3 mod nA
tdA mod nA = m
Figure 5-2: DoS mitigation based on the Key Transport procedure.
only twice for both key generations performed (assuming the use of the group key generation
described in [50]). Finally, if Alice attempts to impersonate another user by using a di¤erent
IDi; then it will immediately be identied since (CRA)
emodnCA = H(nA; IDi) will not hold.
In this case, Bob will only have wasted two modular multiplications and one reception. Figure
5-2 illustrates the complete DoS mitigation procedure depicted in stage A.
Two threat models should be considered in this context. First, Alice can attempt to drain
Bobs energy by continuously requesting to establish a key, each time using a di¤erent ID.
Since Bob is only required to calculate (CRA)
3modnCA and compare it with H(nA; IDA);
the computations involved are two Montgomery multiplications alone [48]. Hence the energy
consumed in each attempt is relatively small. Moreover, the time Bob spends performing the
computations is rather small, thereby not introducing a signicant burden in that sense. Second,
a malicious node impersonating Alice can repeatedly initiate a key establishment process using
IDA. The question is how can Bob know which messages should be ignored? A possible
solution would be to maintain a list of IDs of recent nodes that resulted in failed validation
(step 2). Bob will then refrain from proceeding with key generation requests originating from
these nodes. A time-out mechanism should be employed such that banning of nodes expires
after a reasonable duration of time. An underlying assumption in all threat models considered is
that the attacking node has energy resources that are comparable to those of the node attacked.
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5.1.2 The Approached Node Proving Its Validity
If the rst part of the procedure is successful and Alice has proven that she is who she claims to
be, then Bob will need to do the same. However, if the rst stage does not pass, Bob assumes
that Alice is not valid, and he will discard the rest of the procedure.
The second stage can be realized in three di¤erent ways: (1) using self-certied xed-
key generation [50], [8], [7],.(2) using key transport, and (3) using the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [41]. We next describe each of these methods and discuss their
respective advantages and disadvantages. Moreover, it will be shown that in each of the cases
an ephemeral key is established, which is a primary goal.
Self-Certied DH Fixed Key-Generation
One of the methods in which Bob can prove his validity to Alice is by using the self-certied
xed-key method described in Subsection 2.5.2. The ephemeral method (described in Subsec-
tion 2.5.3) can certainly be used, but when the primary focus is to minimize energy drainage,
a self-certied xed-key generation is advisable (see subsection 2.5.2) since it consists of fewer
computations.
As a reminder, the notations are the following: G - a generating group-point, used by all
relevant nodes; ordG - the order of G. (exponents are calculated modulo ordG); d - the CAs
private key; R - the CAs public key (where R = d G); xi - the private key of node i served
by the CA; Ui - the public key of a node i served by the CA; IDi - the identication details,
or attributes, of node i;H(v;W) - a scalar obtained by performing a hash transformation on
the scalar v and group point W; hi - a random 160-bit scalar generated by the CA (for the
purpose of calculating xi); Ni; Nj- sensor nodes i and j, respectively.
We now go back to the description of the self-certied xed-key method used in 2.5.2:
A self-certied DH xed-key generation is achieved by the following two steps [8] : (1) Ni
and Nj exchange the pairs (IDi ;Ui) and (IDj ;Uj ), respectively, and (2) Ni and Nj generate
the session-key,
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Kij (generated by Ni) = xi  [H(IDj ;Uj )Uj +R]
Kji (generated by Nj) = xj  [H(IDi ;Ui)Ui +R]: (5.1)
The two keys are expected to be identical, having the value xi  xj G. (i.e., Ni calculates:
xi [H(IDj ;Uj )Uj +R] = xi [H(IDj ;Uj )hiG + d G] = xi [H(IDj ;Uj ) hi + d
]G =xixjG: Similar logic is applied by the calculations performed at Nj . However, these
identities hold only for valid IDs. Therefore, to complete the authentication cycle there is a
need for key-conrmation during which the two nodes either verify that they share an identical
key by encrypting and decrypting a test value or by establishing a communication session and
implicitly verify that they share the same key. Verifying that the keys generated by the two
nodes are equal then establishes their correct identities.
A primary contribution o¤ered by this method of self-certied xed-key generation lies in
the number of exponentiations needed to calculate the value xi  xj G: As indicated above,
each node (among each pair of nodes) calculates the value xixjG: Note that the calculations
performed by Ni are Kij = xi [H(IDj ;Uj )Uj +R] = xiH(IDj ;Uj ) Uj + xiR: Further
note that the calculations have been separated into two parts. The rst is a dynamic scalar by
point multiplication executed in an ad hoc manner (as it contains the value Uj ): The second is
a scalar by point multiplication that can be calculated and stored "before" the key-generation
session commences, thereby avoiding the need for a real-time exponentiation (as it contains
information known a priori by node i). It is clear that Ni is able to calculate its session key by
a single online exponentiation (xi  H(IDj ;Uj ) Uj ) instead of two. Similar considerations
apply to Nj .
We shall refer to the joint xed-key shared by Alice and Bob as KAB temp. In addition, as
an integrated part of the key generation process, if the two generated keys are indeed identical,
authentication is achieved. Therefore, the approached node has proven its validity to the
instigator.
The goal of the entire procedure is to establish a shared joint secret key. It is highly





Self-Certified DH Fixed Key-Generation
KAB-temp
KAB-final=H(KAB-temp,m')
Figure 5-3: Ephemeral key generation and denial of service mitigation using a self-certied DH
xed key-generation.
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100 bits200 bits212 bits
xyz
Figure 5-4: Depicting a scenario where the original message is 512 bits.
established. Ephemeral key-generation is more secure and is generally preferred when time and
resources permit. A self-certied DH ephemeral key-generation is also possible ([8]), but would
consume three times more energy when compared to the xed-key case. In order to establish
an ephemeral key, the two nodes can utilize bits in message m, (generated by Bob) excluding
the rst x least signicant bits. Hence, the nal shared ephemeral key can be dened as
KAB final = H(KAB temp;m); (5.2)
where H is a hash function and mis the random message m, excluding the x least signicant
bits (see gure 5-4). Another option would be to simply use the remanding portion of message
m, i.e., m0 as the nal ephemeral key.
Key Transport
Bob can validate himself to Alice by using the RSA key transport method, similar to that
described in section 5.1.1. The random message m generated by Bob was encrypted using
Alices public key nCA and e. After sending the encrypted message t; such that t = memodnA;
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Alice can decrypt the message back using her private key, dA: Eventually, both nodes share the
same secret message m. The remaining bits of message m (excluding the sx least signicant
bits that were used in stage A) are utilized to establish an ephemeral key. For example, if the
length of m is 512 and sx = 100, then there are 412 bits that can be used for authenticating
Bob and establishing the ephemeral secret key. In this scenario, y will denote the 200 bits that
follow x (as depicted in gure 5-4). The subsequent 212 bits of message m will be labeled z.
The following summarizes the key transport procedure considered:
Step 1 - Bob calculates SB = ydB modnB, where y is the next LSB portion of message m.
Step 2 - Bob sends Alice his public key, nB; his identication, IDB; his certicate (issued
by the CA), CRB; and SB: As described above, the certicate is the CAs signature on the
association between nB and IDB: As such, CRB = [H(nB; IDB)]
dCA modnCA: Only the CA
can create CRB by using its private key dCA:
Step 3 - Alice veries the following: (CRB)
emodnCA
?
= H(nB; IDB): If true, Alice knows
that nB and IDB are undeniably linked. Since e = 3; Alice computes only two modular









If true, Alice knows that the corresponding node is indeed Bob, since only he has the same
data, y: The ephemeral key resulting will be denoted by KAB final = z, corresponding to the
most signicant portion of message m. Figure 5-5 illustrates the complete process.
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
Bob can also validate himself to Alice by using ECDSA [4]. The latter is a method for digital
signatures based on ECC. The ECDSA variation proposed utilizing the components of the
message exchanged, m; is:
Step 1 - Bob generates a random number, u, calculates a public value, a point on the curve
V = u G; where G is a generating group-point and calculates C; the scalar representation of












Figure 5-5: Ephemeral key generation and denial of service prevention using key transport.
signature pair (C;L).
Step 2 - Alice calculates h = L 1mod ordG; q1 = y hmod ordG, and q2 = C hmod ordG:
She next obtains the curve point: P = q1  G + q2  nB; where nB is Bobs public key, and
calculates C, the scalar representation of point P: The algorithm concludes when Alice validates
that C = C: If the latter holds, Bob is validated.
Step 3 - The ephemeral key resulting will be denoted by KAB final = z, corresponding to
the most signicant portion of message m. Figure 5-6 illustrates the complete process.
5.1.3 Mathematical Considerations
Let us look at a few mathematical calculations pertaining to Subsection 5.1.1. The following
calculations are associated with the public and private key possessed by Alice and the CA. (The
same calculations will hold to any other node in the cluster):













q2, P and C’
Figure 5-6: Ephemeral key generation and denial of service prevention using ECDSA.
where pi are Pseudo-random prime numbers of 256 bits. We note that there is a small nite
group of 256-bit numbers, hence the use of pseudo-random prime. In general, if ap 1mod p = 1;
or: a
p 1
2 mod p = 1; for a large pool of di¤erent as, then there is a high probability that p is
prime.
The calculation of a
p 1
2 mod p involves the calculation of a modular multiplication of two
scalars, as treated by the Montgomery modular multiplication procedure
Montgomery Modular Multiplication Procedure:
Lets look at an example where the scalars are x and y: The purpose of the procedure is to yield
the result x  y mod p . The procedure processes values which consist of m-bit coe¢ cients. Let
vi denote the ith coe¢ cient of an integer v, where the least signicant coe¢ cient is denoted by
v0. We let k be the number of m-bit coe¢ cients in x and y. Moreover, we let r denote the
value of  p 10 mod 2m (To clarify, p0 represents the least signicant coe¢ cient of the modulus
p). The Montgomery procedure can thus be described as follows:
begin
s = 0; t = 0; v = 0
for i = 0 to k   1
t = s+ xiy
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u = (t0r)0
v = t+ u  p
s = v2m
end (for loop)
if s > n then s = s  p
end
Notice that for each p; we need to calculate the value r =  p 10 mod 2m: This value depends
only on the least signicant coe¢ cient of the modulus p:
Calculating the private key dA and dCA:
dA = e
 1mod'(nA)
 '(nA)-Eulers Totient Function
Eulers Totient Function '(m) returns the number of integers less than m, including 1 that
are relatively prime to m. [For m = p (p- prime), '(p) = p  1].
Hence, '(nA) = (p1   1)(p2   1):
 When using e = 3; as in this case, dA = e 1mod '(nA) = 3 1mod (p1   1)(p2   1):
In order to calculate the value dA = e 1mod'(nA); the following simple procedure can be
performed:
Lets choose p1; p2 such that p1; p2 = 2 mod 3
=) (p1   1)mod 3 = (p2   1)mod 3 = 1
=) (p1   1)(p2   1)mod 3 = 1
=) '(nA)mod 3 = 1











(In this case we do not need to evaluate the multiplicative inverse, enabling an easier cal-
culation).
Checking The Certicate:
As described in Subsection 5.1.1, as a part of the procedure, the approached node needs to
check the certicate of the instigating node by performing the following:
CRA = [H(nA; IDA)]
dCA modnCA




= H(nA; IDA) () (CRA)3modnCA
?
= H(nA; IDA)







modnCA = [H(nA; IDA)]
dCA3modnCA:
Since dCA = 3 1mod'(nCA); dCA  3 = 1
=) (CRA)3 = [H(nA; IDA)]1modnCA = H(nA; IDA)
[H(nA; IDA) < nCA = p1p2] :
5.2 Implementation Results
This section presents implementation results pertaining to all three methods described in stage
B, in which the approached node proves its validity, providing a comparison in terms of timing
and energy resources.
The methodology descried in stage A and all of the three methodologies discussed in stage B
were implemented on the Intel Mote 2 [6] platform. The latter employs the Intel PXA271 XScale
Processor running at a clock frequency ranging from 13 MHz to 416 MHz. The core frequency
can be dynamically set in software, allowing the designer to carefully adjust the timing/power
trade-o¤ so as to optimize performance of a particular application. Functions were taken from
the TinyECC package [49]. The latter targeted the MICA2 platform and provided a basic
library of ECC-based functions, including scalar multiplication and exponentiation operations.
Customizations for the XScale processor, including 32-bit operation optimizations, were carried
out. In addition, supplementary functions, such as e¢ cient Montgomery arithmetic, were added.
All codes are written in NesC running on the TinyOS operating system. Nodes exchange
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messages using a 2.4 GHz embedded low-power radio transceiver. In all of the implementations
depicted below, the clock frequency was 312MHz, scalars (for key transport usage) were 1024
bits, scalars (for ECC based computations) were 160 bits, and points on the curve (for ECC
based computations) were 160 bits for each of the vertices. It should be noted that 160-bit keys
in ECC are equivalent, from a cryptocomplexity perspective, to 1024-bit keys in RSA.
Self-certied xed-key generation, excluding DoS mitigation, takes one dynamic point-by-
scalar multiplications. Hence, on the Intel mote 2 platform the process takes 42 msec to
complete and consumes 22 mJ at each node (see table 3.3)
Stage A, in which Alice proves her validity to Bob, is identical regardless of the methodology
chosen in Part B. For the latter, it is imperative to understand the overhead involved in cal-
culating tdA modnA = m: All other calculations and communications are relatively negligible.
For a key size of 1024 bits (for both dA and nA) the computation took Alice 230 msec and
drained 105.8 mJ. On the other hand, Bobs calculation of (CRA)
3modnCA took 1.02 msec
and drained only 0.469 mJ. The energy consumed when Alice performs her procedure is three
orders of a magnitude larger than the energy consumed when Bob performs his. The results
were 230 msec and 105.8 mJ, substantiating the e¤ectiveness of the procedure proposed. All
other computations and transmissions are relatively negligible.
In stage B, when using key transport, Bob is required to perform the exact symmetrical
procedure that Alice preformed in stage A, i.e., SB = ydB modn: Hence Bob will spend 230
msec and 105.8 mJ. In the validation process, Alice will perform the following two calculations:
(CRB)
emodnCA; (SB)
3modnB and will have spent 2.04 msec and 0.938 mJ. When using
ECDSA, the important computations are point-by-scalar multiplications. As described above,
Bob preforms one point-by-scalar multiplication while Alice performs two. When using the
self-certied xed-key method, each of the nodes performs one point-by-scalar multiplication.
Each multiplication takes about 42 msec and consumes 22 mJ. Please see tables 5.1 and 5.2 for
details. All other computations and transmissions are relatively negligible.
As expected, using key transport as means of certication is not benecial in resource
constrained environments. In other applications, where resources are not scarce, key transport
can be extremely useful, since there is no need for additional elliptic curve calculations (as
in ECDSA and xed-key scenarios). It should be noted that calculations of the key transport
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Table 5.1: Time (msec) and energy (mJ) consumed while performing stage A and stage B for
1024-bit RSA and 160-bit ECC on the Intel mote 2 patform for 312 MHz core clock
Time (msec) Energy (mJ) Total
Alice Bob Alice Bob Time Energy
Stage A 230 1.02 105.8 0.469 231.02 106.27
Stage B
Key Transport 2.04 230 0.938 105.8 232.04 106.738
ECDSA 83 42 44 22 125 66
Fixed Key 42 42 22 22 84 44
Table 5.2: Total time (msec) and energy (mJ) consumed by each of the three techniques for
ephemeral key establishment in the DoS mitigation
Time (msec) Energy (mJ)
Total consumption Both stages Both stages
Key Transport 463.06 213.01
ECDSA 356.02 172.27
Fixed Key 315.02 150.27
method in both stages are almost symmetric when it comes to the computational load that Bob
and Alice have. When comparing ECDSA to xed-key generation, we come to the conclusion




Given that wireless sensor nodes are very limited in energy, memory and processing resources,
it is imperative to e¢ ciently utilize the existing resources in any computational task performed.
The cryptography eld employs numerous fundamental arithmetic algorithms. Two such algo-
rithms, the Montgomery arithmetic for modular multiplication and the generation of a modular
multiplicative inverse, are treated in this chapter. As indicated in previous chapters, the core
calculation (for example, when establishing a secret key) using ECC is the point-by-scalar
multiplication. As part of this elaborate calculation, there is a need to compute modular multi-
plication between two scalars. It is this modular scalar-by-scalar multiplication that utilizes the
above mentioned algorithms. In order to multiply we need to use the Montgomery arithmetic
for modular multiplication, and as part of this arithmetic, the modular multiplicative inverse
of a scalar is computed. While simulating various key generation schemes, it became apparent
that these two algorithms are frequently called upon, which raised the clear need for their e¢ -
cient lightweight realization. The following sections provide a description of the algorithms and
their proposed light-weight implementations in detail.
6.1 A System-Level E¢ cient Utilization of the Montgomery
Procedure
Modular exponentiation constitutes a fundamental building block in public key cryptographic















Figure 6-1: The chain of importance in the PKC key establishment process, illustrating the
essential role of the Montgomery procedure
associated with a scalar curve-point multiplication, which we shall refer to as the ECC expo-
nentiation core [44], [55]. Such cores facilitate the execution of several modular multiplication
operations needed in various applications, ranging from digital signatures to key establishments.
The challenge faced by the designers concern the e¢ cient execution of these modular multipli-
cation operations when providing for a specic application. A typical chain of importance is
depicted in gure 6-1.
This section pertains to public key cryptographic certication. In explicit certication, the
CA signs the association between a users ID/attributes (and other administrative details), and
the users public key. The CA does so by using standard digital signature techniques in which
the generated signature acts as a certicate attesting to the validity of the values submitted by
users. In implicit certication [32],[63],[7], authenticity of parameters submitted by a user is
established as an inherent part of executing the application served by these parameters, where
the CAs public key is one of the inputs to the process.
Next, a description of the steps to be carried out by the CA when generating explicit or
implicit certicates is provided. These steps are carried out in order to simplify the execution
of the operations subsequently performed by the veriers of the issued certicates. In view of
the above, we consider the modular multiplication operations that employ an exponentiation
core, treating the core as a given module.
An exemplifying case of explicit certication (that is, a direct digital signature generated by
the CA) is the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm [4] (ECDSA). An exemplifying case
for implicit certication is the self-certication methodology presented in [7]. The framework
presented here can be applied to a wide range of public key cryptographic applications.
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6.1.1 Observations on Montgomery Arithmetic Constructs
We next briey review the Montgomery modular multiplication of two scalars, p and q, to yield
p  q mod n [48]. The procedure (also presented in 5.1.3) processes values represented in base
2m, that is, they consist of m-bit coe¢ cients. Let vi denote the ith coe¢ cient of an integer
v, where the least signicant coe¢ cient is denoted by v0. We let k be the number of m-bit
coe¢ cients in p and q. Moreover, we let r denote the value of  n 10 mod 2m (To clarify, n0
represents the least signicant coe¢ cient of the modulus n). The Montgomery procedure can
thus be described as follows:
Procedure 1: Montgomery modular multiplication
begin
s = 0; t = 0; v = 0
for i = 0 to k   1
t = s+ qip
u = (t0r)0
v = t+ u  n
s = v2m
end (for loop)
if s > n then s = s  n
end
In the above, s = pq 2 mkmodn. However, our purpose is to obtain the result: pqmodn.
The operation t = s+ qi  p that is executed k times, where k is the number of m bit coe¢ cients
comprising the multiplier q, is the pure multiplication operation p  q. Similarly, the operation
v = t + u  n is also a pure multiplication. The only di¤erence between multiplication of the
form t = s + qi  p and that of the form v = t + u  n is the fact that the qi0s are known a
priori, while the us are generated dynamically. There are two additional m-bit operations
in the procedure, involving single coe¢ cients, both intended to guarantee that t and v do
not exceed k + 1 coe¢ cients (with an exception of a possible 1-bit overow). These m bit
operations e¤ectively render the entire procedure a character-level shift-and-add operation.
Intuitively, the division essence of modular multiplication is realized at them bit character-level,
by the dynamic generation of the us. This holds since division is based on dynamic decisions
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concerning the subtraction of a divisor, while in multiplication, the decisions of whether to add
the multiplicand or not are known in advance and depend on the particular structure of the
multiplier.
As indicated before, in Procedure 1, s = p  q  2 mkmodn. However, our purpose is to
obtain the result: p  qmodn. In order to eliminate the undesired multiplicative factor 2 mk;
we apply Procedure 1 for a second time, where p and q are replaced by p  q  2 mkmodn (the
result obtained from the rst round) and 22mk - a system constant that can be precalculated
and stored. The output of the second stage will be the desired result of p  qmodn:
As indicated, Procedure 1 does not yield the nal desired result of p  qmodn, but rather
the value p  q  2 mkmodn, necessitating the execution of Procedure 1 for a second time.
This introduces a major deviation from the ultimate goal of calculating p  qmodn using two
pure m bit multiplications, hence using Procedure 1 only once. Here we will show how this
ultimate goal can be achieved for the case of executing modular multiplication operations that
employ an exponentiation core within the framework of public key cryptographic certication.
In particular, we provide detailed treatment of both explicit and implicit certication. The
former is shown for digital signature generation and verication based on ECDSA, while the
latter pertains to self-certied Di¢ e-Hellman key-establishment [7].
A fundamental observation is that if the CA employs Procedure 1 only once during certicate
generation, that is, it executes two pure m bit multiplications, then the certicate veriers are
also required to employ Procedure 1 only once. In these cases, the undesired multiplicative
factor of the Montgomery arithmetic operation has no e¤ect, thus the procedure is executed
only once.
6.1.2 Explicit Certication based on ECDSA
The ECDSA [4] algorithm enables signature generation and signature verication procedures.
As a preliminary stage, all participants agree on specic curve parameters and a generating
point, G, of order ordG (exponents are calculated modulo ordG). The signers private key is
s while his public key is the curve pointW = s G, where  represents a scalar curve-point
multiplication. Letting f denote the message to be signed, the following outlines the signature
generation and verication procedures:
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Procedure 2: ECDSA signature generation
1. The CA generates a random number u and calculates V = uG
2. Let c be a scalar representation of V, utilizing the standard procedure specied in [4],
the CA calculate d = u 1  (f + s  c) mod ordG to obtain the pair (c; d) as the signature.
Procedure 3: ECDSA signature verication
1. Compute h = d 1 mod ordG, m = f h mod ordG and q = c h mod ordG, based on the
veriers knowledge of G; ordG;W; f; c, and d:
2. Obtain the curve point P = mG+ q W.
Let cbe the scalar representation of P, using the standard procedure specied in [4].
3. If c= c then the signature is determined to be valid.
In both procedures (yielding the signature generation and signature verication operations)
there is a need to perform a modular multiplication, hence necessitating the need to execute
procedure 1 twice.
We next describe how the execution of the control operations can be carried out using pure
multiplications in the framework of explicit certication.
Observing the expression d = u 1  (f + s  c) mod ordG in Procedure 2, where the pair
(c; d) is the generated signature, we let the signing CA calculate h = d 1modordG = u 
(f + s  c) 1modordG. Furthermore, we let t = c  2 mkmod ordG; which can be calculated
by multiplying c by 1, using Procedure 1. Thus, the explicit certicate is the pair (t; h).
Subsequently, the verier performs the following:
1. Computes
m = f  h  2 mkmodordG and q = c  h  2 mkmodordG: (6.1)
2. Computes the curve point P = mG+ q W
3. Let tbe the scalar representation of P, if t0 = t then the signature is determined to be
valid.
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As can be observed from the above, the calculation of the modular multiplication represented
in equation 6.1 is achieved by executing Procedure 1 only once. No operation was made to
remove the multiplicative factor 2 mk, as this is compensated by using the new certicate
(t; h):
6.1.3 Implicit Certication in Self-certied Procedures
Let d be the CAs private key and R its public key (where R = d  G). User i, served by
the CA, is denoted by Ni, with a private key, xi. hi is a random scalar, unique to each user,
generated by the CA for the purpose of calculating the private keys. Ui is dened as the public
key of user i, and H(v;W) is a scalar obtained by performing a hash transformation on the
scalar v and curve-pointW: To issue N 0is public and private keys, the CA generates the random
scalar hi. Respectively, the two keys are given by
Ui = hi G (6.2)
xi = [H(IDi;Ui)  hi + d] mod ordG:
N 0js public and private keys are issued in a similar manner.
Fixed Key-Generation
We briey review the steps to be executed in achieving self-certied xed-key generation (as
discussed in section 2.5.2).
1. Ni and Nj exchange the pairs (IDi;Ui) and (IDj ;Uj), respectively
2. Kij (generated by Ni) = xi  [H(IDj ;Uj)  Uj + R]; while Kji (generated by Nj) =
xj  [H(IDi;Ui)Ui +R]: Note that all scalar by scalar multiplications are calculated
modulo ordG:
All modular multiplications needed for the above procedures are performed mod ordG.
Since Ui = hi  G; the argument H(IDj ;Uj)  Uj necessitates the calculation of
H(IDj ;Uj)  hi  G, where H(IDj ;Uj)  hi is a modular multiplication necessitating
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the execution of Procedure 1 twice.
These operations can be the result of executing Procedure 1 only once, based on the follow-
ing:
Key issuing by the CA: N 0is public and private keys are
Ui = hi G (6.3)
xi =
h
H(IDi;Ui)  hi  2 mk + d
i
mod ordG
The argument H(IDi;Ui)  hi  2 mk is derived by performing Procedure 1 only once. Similar
calculations hold for user Nj :
Key-generation: In order to generate the xed-key, the two steps are:
1. Ni and Nj exchange the pairs (IDi;Ui) and (IDj ;Uj), respectively
2. Kij = xi [H(IDj ;Uj)  2 mk Uj +R]; and Kji = xj  [H(IDi;Ui)  2 mk Ui+R]:
Hence Kij = xi  [H(IDj ;Uj)  2 mk Uj +R] = xi  (H(IDj ;Uj)  2 mk  hi + d) G
= xi  xj G: Similar considerations apply for Kji: A key conrmation should now follow. If
indeed Kij = Kji; then we observe xed-key self-certication.
It should be noted that all modular multiplications performed by Ni and Nj were based on
executing Procedure 1 only once. No operation was made to remove the multiplicative factor
2 mk, as this is compensated by the CA carrying out the same operation during the key issuing
process.
Ephemeral Key-Generation
As described in section 2.5.3, in order to achieve a self-certied ephemeral key-generation, users
Ni and Nj perform the following:
1. Ni and Nj generate a random scalar pvi and pvj ; respectively
2. Ni calculates the ephemeral value EVi = pv i  G: Nj calculates the ephemeral value
EVj = pv j G
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3. Ni and Nj exchange the values (IDi;Ui;EVi) and (IDj ;Uj ;EVj), respectively
4. Kij (generated by Ni)= pvi  [H(IDj ;Uj)]Uj +R] + (xi + pvi)EVj ;
Kji (generated by Nj) = pvj  [H(IDi;Ui)]Ui +R] + (xj + pvj)EVi
All modular multiplications in the above procedures are preformed mod ordG: Again,
sinceUi = hiG; the argumentH(IDj ;Uj)Uj necessitates the calculation ofH(IDj ;Uj)
hi which is a modular multiplication necessitating the execution of Procedure 1 twice. .
These operations can be the result of executing Procedure 1 only once, based on the follow-
ing:
Key issuing by the CA: Considering users Ni and Nj ;we have
Ui = hi G (6.4)
xi =
h
H(IDi;Ui)  hi  2 mk + d
i
mod ordG;
Uj = hj G
xj =
h
H(IDj ;Uj) hj  2 mk + d
i
mod ordG:
Once again, the distinction in the proposed improvement lies in the arguments H(IDj ;Uj) 
hj 2 mk and H(IDj ;Uj) hj 2 mk derived by performing Procedure 1 only once. The following
steps are followed in order to generate the self-certied ephemeral key:
1. Ni and Nj generate a random scalar pvi and pvj ; respectively
2. Ni calculates the ephemeral value EVi = pv i  G: Nj calculates the ephemeral value
EVj = pv j G
3. Ni and Nj exchange the values (IDi;Ui;EVi) and (IDj ;Uj ;EVj), respectively
4. Kij (generated by Ni) = pvi  [H(IDj ;Uj)]  2 mk Uj +R] + (xi + pvi)EVj ;















Figure 6-2: The chain of importance in the PKC key establishment process, illustrating the
important role of the modular multiplication procedure
Hence Kij = pvj [H(IDj ;Uj) 2 mkUj+R]+(xj+pvj)EVi = pvj [H(IDj ;Uj) 
2 mk hi+d ]G+(xj+pvj)EVi =pvixjG+xipvjG+pvipvjG. Similar
considerations apply for Kji:
A key conrmation should now follow. If indeed Kij = Kji ;then we observe an ephemeral
key self-certication.
As in the case of xed-key generation, all modular multiplications performed by Ni and
Nj were based on executing Procedure 1 only once. No operation was applied to remove the
multiplicative factor 2 mk, as this is compensated by the CA performing the same operation
during key issuing.
Procedure 1 ends with the need to subtract the modulus n from the resultant value s, in
cases of s > n . While this may be computationally negligible, it somewhat disrupts the goal
of treating Procedure 1 as a pure two-multiplications operation. In this respect, it is observed
that for the cases in which the value generated by the procedure is intended to be used as a
scalar in an ECC scalar-point multiplication (or as an exponent in public key cryptographic
implementations over integers), this nal operation in Procedure 1 can be discarded. In other
words, the value s can be kept as it is, even if it exceeds s. This is permitted since the
multiplication of s by a point reduces it modulo ordG.
6.2 Modular Multiplicative Inverse
When attempting to calculate a modular multiplication between two scalars, we utilized the
Montgomery algorithm as indicated in the previous section. In order to perform these com-
putations, one must calculate a negative modulo 2m multiplicative inverse. The multiplicative
inverse modulo 2m of an odd value b, denoted by b 1mod2m, is a value r where br = 1mod 2m.
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Without loss of generality it can be assumed that b < 2m, (i.e., b is an m-bit value), since oth-
erwise b is rst taken mod2m (i.e., only the least m signicant bits in the binary representation
of b are selected) before proceeding with the calculation of r. The binary representation of r
also consists of m bits. Consequently, this section is divided into two parts. The rst pertains
to the calculation of a modular 2m multiplicative inverse of a parameter, i.e. b 1mod (2m) ;
and the second addresses the calculation of a negative modular 2m multiplicative inverse of a
parameter, i.e.  b 1mod (2m).
All of these basic computations are extremely useful and desired tools in the world of number
theory, in general, and in the eld of cryptography in particular. Classic example of scenarios
in which the modulus is a power of 2 are the Montgomery modular multiplication [48] and the
exact division problem [64], [40]. In the latter, one has a list of odd word-sized numbers each
divisible by k, and there is a need to divide all of them by k. Here it is needed to compute
b 1mod2m where m is the number of bits in a word.
This section presents procedures for calculating a multiplicative inverse modulo 2m using
a novel mathematical approach that is not an extension or modication of known approaches
such as: [24] , [46], [37], [61], [47]. These known algorithms that perform the above calculations
involve a number of steps linearly proportional to the number of characters in a number. This
chapter demonstrates an e¢ cient methodology for a character-based computation of modular
multiplicative inverses that involve a power of 2, reducing these calculations to a logarithmic
number of steps. Hence, the amount of calculations involved and the computational resources
are tremendously decreased form an O(m) complexity to a O(logm) complexity, where m is the
amount of characters in the number.
6.2.1 Calculating the expression b 1mod (2m)
This section presents a procedure for calculating the multiplicative inverses modulo 2m based
on a novel mathematical approach. The procedure is suitable for software implementation on a
general-purpose processor. When counting the total number of word-level processor multiplica-
tions, the computational e¤ort involved in calculating a multiplicative inverse is two thirds that
of a single multiplication of m-bit values, in addition to a few word-level multiplications. For
standard processor word sizes, the number of these additional multiplications does not exceed
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12.
As indicated above, the multiplicative inverse modulo 2m of a value b, is a value r, where
b  r = 1mod 2m. By denition, b is not necessarily restricted to be an m  bit integer, although
in practice this is usually the case. Hence, the desired result is r = b 1mod2m. Cases where
the modulus is a power of 2 are encountered in various modular multiplication procedures
(such as in the Montgomery algorithm for modular multiplications). These calculations are
straightforward but at the same time consume a great deal of computation.
Straightforward Calculations
The following are several known or straightforward algorithms for calculating b 1mod2m. The
rst is taken from Dusse and Kaliski [24].
Algorithm 1 Dusse and Kaliskis method for calculating r = b 1mod2m
y1 = 1
for i = 2 to m
if b  yi 1 < 2i 1mod2i
then yi = yi 1
else yi = yi 1 + 2i 1
The value of ym is the desired result r = b 1mod2m:
The following is a straightforward method for obtaining the same result.
Algorithm 2 Calculating r = b 1mod2m by controlled additions of left-shifts of b
Since b r = 1mod 2m, the m least signicant bits of the complete product b r are of the form
000:::01. To obtain r, one should therefore add selected left-shifts of the binary representation
of b such that the addition of the shifts generates the m least signicant bits 000:::01. The
coe¢ cients of the added left-shifts form the binary representation of r. (We form here a standard
shift-and-add multiplication, where the multiplicand b is known, and the m least signicant bits
of the product are given. From this we recover the multiplier r, bit by bit, starting from the
LSB.)
This algorithm is always feasible to implement since b is odd, having 1 as the least signicant
bit. Hence, by adding selected left-shifts of b to an accumulated sum that starts with b, one can
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xx… ...x 00… ...01
m bits m bits
Figure 6-3: Illustration of the identity expression r  b = x  2m + 1
always generate a value whose m least signicant bits are of any form, including 000:::01. In
other words, Algorithm 2 is executed by slidingb left across an accumulated sum, such that
the least signicant bit of b generates the bits of the given product, one at a time, from right
to left.
As an example, let kH and kL respectively denote the higher half and lower half of the
binary representation of an 2m   bit value, k. Each of these halves is an m   bit value. The
relation b  r = 1mod (2m) means that b  r = x  2m + 1 for some integer x. This means that
the following m   bit identity hold: (b  r)L = (000:::01)2. Figure 6-3 visually illustrates this
identity.
Since the multiplication r b has the structure indicated above, calculating r becomes rather
straightforward.
1. Lets look at the following example where we want to calculate the modular 24 multi-





: We begin by shifting and adding the binary representation of 3, i.e.
(0011)2, until the least signicant part of the additions will consist of the sequence "0001".
Figure 6-4 shows the manner by which additions are employed. Since the coe¢ cients of
the added shifts are 20; 21 and 23; the representation of r is: 20 + 21 + 23 = (11)10 =
(1011)2 ) 11; which is the modular 24 multiplicative inverse of 3:
The above bit-wise straightforward procedure for calculating a multiplicative inverse modulo
2m is rather time consuming. If such a calculation is seldom performed in a given application, it
may be justied to utilize the bit-wise procedure. However, when there is a need to frequently
perform such a calculation, it is advisable to try and execute this procedure by performing
character-level multiplication, fully exploiting the processing power of a given processor.
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                    0 0 1 1
              0 0 1 1
  0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Figure 6-4: Shifting and adding the binary representation of 3 until the least signicant part of
the additions includes four bits in the format "0001"
Calculating b 1mod2m can be based on initially computing 2 mmod b and then recovering
b 1mod2m by one division of a 2m-bit value by an m-bit value as shown by Algorithm 3a
followed by Algorithm 3b below.
Algorithm 3 Calculating r = b 1mod2m in two steps
Algorithm 3a: Calculating 2 mmod b by m successive divisions of 2 mod b
d = 1
for i = 1 to m
if d is odd then d = d+ b
d = d=2
The nal value of d is, of course, 2 mmod b:
Algorithm 3b: Recovering r = b 1mod2m out of s = 2 mmod b
The desired r = b 1mod2m is recovered out of s = 2 mmod b as follows:
t = s  2m
u = (t  1)=b
r = 2m   u
To realize why Algorithm 3b is valid note that the relation s = 2 mmod b means that
t = s  2m = u  b+1 and the value u, calculated in the second step of Algorithm 3b, is therefore
an integer. That is, u  b = s  2m  1. Taking both sides of the latter relation mod2m yields the
congruence ub =  1mod 2m. That is, ( u)b = 1mod 2m, and therefore  u = r = b 1mod2m.
However,  u = (2m   u)mod 2m, which completes the validity proof for Algorithm 3b.
Another method of calculating modular multiplicative inverses is The Extended Euclid Al-
gorithm [46]. It is important to note that this algorithm treats odd moduli. Therefore, when
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computing r = b 1mod2m, we rst calculate the multiplicative inverse of 2m modulo the odd b,
and then exchange the role of the two values 2m and b. Algorithm 3a is precisely the Extended
Euclid Algorithm when used in calculating 2 m mod b, while Algorithm 3b is the procedure of
exchanging 2m and b. Methods of calculating modular multiplicative inverses further include
the Montgomery Inverse Algorithm [37], [61]. This algorithm, which treats an odd moduli,
consists of two phases of which the second is identical to Algorithm 3a. Since the modulus is
odd, calculating r = b 1mod2m further necessitates the procedure of Algorithm 3b. Other
methods presented in the literature for calculating b 1mod2m include lookup table techniques
such as that proposed in [47], which are inherently non-algorithmic.
E¢ cient Calculations
Let kH and kL denote the higher half and lower half of the binary representation of a 2i-bit
value k, respectively. Each of these halves is an i-bit value. For example, in the relation b  r
= 1mod 2i, i.e., b  r = x  2i + 1 for some integer x, (b  r)L = (000:::01)2. In order to calculate
r = b 1mod2m;, we rst consider the calculation of p = q 1mod22i given q 1L mod2
i.
Theorem 1 Given b and r as i-bit values, where r = b 1mod 2i, and given q as a 2i-bit value
where qL = b; the value p = q 1mod22i can be e¢ ciently obtained by calculating its lower half;
pL, and its higher half, pH (both are i-bit values independently).
The Lower Half of p can be calculated as
pL = r; (6.5)
while the Higher Half of p can be calculated as
pH =   [[(r  b)H + (r  qH)L]  r]mod 2
i; (6.6)
where p is formed by the concatenation between pH and pL such that p = pH jpL:
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Proof. The relation p = q 1mod22i suggests that pq = 1mod 22i. From the multiplication
p  q, we derive that
(pHpL)  (qHqL) = pH  qH  22i + (pH  qL + pL  qH)  2i + pL  qL; (6.7)
as depicted in gure 6-5. Therefore, the 2i least signicant bits of p  q = (pHpL)  (qHqL) can
be written as 
(pH  qL + pL  qH)  2i + pL  qL

mod22i: (6.8)
Since p  q = 1mod 22i,

(pH  qL + pL  qH)  2i + pL  qL

= 1mod 22i: (6.9)
Calculating the Lower Part of p
Since the i least signicant bits of (pH qL+pL qH) 2i+pL qL are also the i least signicant
bits of pL qL, only pL qL dictates that the i least signicant bits of (pH qL+pL qH)L 2i+pL qL
are 1 (see gure 6-5 for details). That is,
pL  qL = 1 =) pL  qL = 1mod 2i =) pL = q 1L mod2
i: (6.10)
Since qL = b and r = b 1mod2i;
pL = r:
Calculating the Higher Part of p
Given that the 2i least signicant bits of the expression (pH  qL+ pL  qH)  2i+ pL  qL form
the value 1,
[(pH  qL + pL  qH)L + (pL  qL)H ]mod 2i = 0 (6.11)
(see the middle section in Figure 6-5 for details). That is,
(pH  qL)L =  (pL  qL)H   (pL  qH)Lmod2i: (6.12)
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Since the least signicant component, kL, of a number k is also k mod2i,
pH =  [[(pL  qL)H + (pL  qH)L]  q 1L ]mod 2
i: (6.13)
As qL = b, r = b 1mod 2i and pL = r; we conclude that
pH =   [[(r  b)H + (r  qH)L]  r]mod 2
i: (6.14)
Example 1 To illustrate this result, we refer to the following example. For simplicity, all
numbers are displayed in hexadecimal base. Our purpose is to nd p = q 1mod232, given that
q = 99F8A5EF and qL = b, where r = b 1 = (A5EF )
 1 = 290F mod 216. Using the e¢ cient
calculation method described in Theorem 1, we can derive that pL = r = 290F . In order to
calculate pH we are required to follow three easy steps:
1. (r  b)H = (290F A5EF )H = 1A9D
2. (r  qH)L = (290F  99F8)L = BD88
3. pH =  [((r  b)H + (qH  r)L)  r]mod 216 =  ((1A9D +BD88)  290F )mod 216 = 68D5
In order to obtain the nal result, p, all that is left is the concatenation. Hence, p =
pH jpL = 68D5290F: The result can be checked by validating the following equality p  q =
68D5290F  99F8A5EF = 3F0D37FD00000001 = 1 mod 232:
Theorem 1 species the three operations: (r  b)H , (r  qH)L and [(r  b)H+(r  qH)L]rmod2i:
All values are i-bit long. The rst operation involves the multiplication of i-bit values. On the
other hand, when performing the latter two, only the lower half of the generated product is
(qH qL)
 . ( pH pL)
                                                   qL
 .  pL
qL
 .    pH
                          +    qH
 .    pL
                qH
 .pH (m bits)(m bits)
Figure 6-5: The format of (pH  qL + pL  qH)  2m + pL  qL
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needed, requiring half of the full multiplication e¤ort. This leads us to the following conclusion:
Conclusion 1 The execution of Theorem 1 altogether involves the computation of two multi-
plications of i-bit values.
Theorem 1 is used in reaching the nal goal of calculating b 1mod2m. The fundamental
process of the theorem can be iteratively repeated logm times, by doubling the number of bits
when calculating the modular inverse in each iteration. At the end of such process, we are left
with b 1mod2m: An illustrative example of this process is discussed in the subsection below.
Computational E¤orts
We begin with an introductory graphical illustration, depicted in Figure 6-6, demonstrating the
proposed procedure for calculating b 1mod2m; where m = 8-bits. Finding the multiplicative
inverse of the number 00abcdefgh00 comprises of the following steps:
0. Finding the multiplicative inverse of 0h0 modulo 21: Note that 0h0 is 1 since the number
00abcdefgh00 is odd. For the same reason, the inverse of 0h0 is also 1;
1. Finding the multiplicative inverse of 00gh00 modulo 22, by exploiting the result from step
(0);
2. Finding the multiplicative inverse of 00efgh00 modulo 24 using the result obtain in step
(1) and, nally,
3. Finding the multiplicative inverse of the entire number 00abcdefgh00 modulo 28 by using
the result from step (2).
It is noted that steps (1)-(3) are achieved by using Theorem 1.
Overall Computational E¤orts in Terms of Word-Level Processor Multiplications
In the case treated by this section, r = b 1mod2m is calculated, where m is a power of 2.
Consider the case where each digit in the illustration of Figure 6-6 is a processor-word of k-bits.
In practice, k is a power of 2. Letting n = mk , the representation of r and b consists of n words.
The process illustrated in Figure 6-6 suggests that log n consecutive doublings of h 1mod2k
yield r = (abcdefgh) 1mod2m (where h is the right most word of abcdefgh). In the j-th stage,
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j = 0; 1; :::; log n 1, a value consisting of 2j words is doubled in size. Based on the observation
in Conclusion1, such doubling requires two multiplications of values consisting of 2j words. One




22j single-word multiplications. It should be noted that 222(log n 1) = 2(n2 )
2,




multiplications. The total number of single-word multiplications required when calculating
r = b 1mod2m, given the initial value h 1mod2k, is therefore 2  [
logn 1P
j=0
22j ] = 2(n
2 1)
3 , where
n2 is the number of single-word multiplications executed when multiplying two m-bit operands.
By denition, each such operand consists of n words.
Let us now evaluate the computational e¤ort involved in calculating h 1mod2k. This calcu-
lation in itself requires log k executions of the process in Theorem 1, doubling 1-bit; 2-bit; :::; k2 -
bit, values. Since this section also concerns software implementations using a general-purpose
processor, these log k small values should each be considered as a complete processor word.
Thus, when implementing Conclusion 1, this e¤ort requires 2  log k single-word multiplications.




+ 2 log k (6.15)
Standard sizes for a processor word are 8; 16; 32; 64-bits, for which log k = 3, 4, 5, 6, where
n2 is the number of single-word multiplications executed when multiplying two m-bit operands.
It is concluded that the computational e¤ort involved in calculating the multiplicative inverse
of an odd value b modulo 2m is two thirds of one multiplication of m-bit values, plus a negligible
number of single-word multiplications which in practical cases does not exceed 12 (= 2 log k).





Figure 6-6: Finding the multiplicative inverse of the number represented by "abcdefgh".
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Performance Comparison
The performance of the presented procedure for calculating b 1mod2m is compared to that
of other procedures based on two criteria: (1)the ability for software execution on a general-
purpose processor, and (2)the computational e¤ort, measured in terms of the overall number
of executed word-level multiplications.
The presented procedure was shown to be suitable for software implementation on a general-
purpose processor. When counting the total number of word-level multiplications, it was shown
that the computational e¤ort involved in calculating b 1mod2m is two thirds of one multipli-
cation of m-bit values, plus a few word-level multiplications, whose number in practice does
not exceed 12.
Algorithm 1 [24] is executed in m  1 steps, each one involving the multiplication operation
b  yi 1, where the multiplicand consists of m bits. The procedure can be naturally performed
in software using a general-purpose processor. In contrast, this section presents an approach in
which the overall number of single-word multiplications is equivalent to a single m-bit multi-
plication, also executed on a general-purpose processor.
Algorithm 2 is executed in m steps, involving shifts-and-adds. Altogether this is equivalent
to one multiplication of m-bit values. Shifts and decisions are being made at the bit-level.
Therefore, on the one hand, the computational e¤ort is equivalent to one m-bit multiplication,
like the procedure presented in this section. On the other hand, the bit-level considerations
in Algorithm 2 pose implementation di¢ culties on a general-purpose processor, a disadvantage
which the procedure presented in this section overcomes.
Algorithm 3 is executed in m steps involving shifts-and-adds. Shifts and decisions in Algo-
rithm 3a are made at the bit-level. Therefore, the procedure presented in this section outper-
forms Algorithm 3 as far as both discussed criteria are concerned.
It should be noted that the Montgomery modular multiplication procedure [48] yields the
value x  y  2 mmod b, for m-bit operands. Algorithm 3a can therefore be replaced by Mont-
gomery procedure, for x = y = 1 (yielding 2 mmod b). The replacement of Algorithm 3a by a
Montgomery multiplication can possibly have the advantage of running in software on a general
processor, utilizing word-level multiplications. Regardless of this e¤ort, there is still a need to
perform a division by an m-bit value, as required by Algorithm 3b. Therefore, the procedure
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presented in this section signicantly outperforms this case too.
We next compare the procedure proposed in this section to the Extended Euclid Algorithm
[46] and to the Montgomery Inverse Algorithm [37], [61]. As shown in this section, Algo-
rithm 3a is precisely the Extended Euclid Algorithm when used in calculating 2 m mod b,
while Algorithm 3b is the procedure of exchanging the role of 2m and b, yielding the result
b 1mod2m. Hence, Algorithms 3a+3b are the implementation of the Extended Euclid Algo-
rithm for the case treated in this section. The Montgomery Inverse Algorithm treats an odd
modulus. Therefore, an implementation of this algorithm in calculating b 1mod2m would mean
that 2 mmod b is calculated rst, and b 1mod2m is then recovered by executing Algorithm
3b. Accordingly, Algorithm 3b is still needed when using the Montgomery Inverse Algorithm.
Furthermore, Algorithm 3a is the second phase of the Montgomery Inverse Algorithm. There-
fore, when calculating b 1mod2m, the execution of Algorithms 3a+3b is more e¢ cient than the
Montgomery Inverse. It is concluded that the procedure presented in this section for calculating
b 1mod2m, which outperforms Algorithms 3a+3b as shown above, outperforms the Extended
Euclid Algorithm and the Montgomery Inverse Algorithm.
Beside the practical advantages (shown above) of the presented procedure, it should be noted
again that the mathematical approach taken by this section is di¤erent from those treated in
all of the above referenced papers.
Treating the Case where m is not a Power of 2
Let a 1 = b mod p and q be a divisor of p. Basic observations in number theory show that
[a mod q] 1 = b mod q: For clarication, letting a = 11, p = 14 and q = 7, it is evident that
11 1 = 9mod 14, and 4 1 = 2mod 7.
The procedure presented in section 6.2.1 treats the case where m is a power of 2 (allowing
for the described consecutive doublings). In cases where m is not a power of 2, the binary
representation of b consists of n = 2dlog me bits, and the value w = b 1mod2n is calculated
in dlog me steps, based on the procedure of section 6.2.1. Consequently, r = wmod2m is the
required result b 1mod2m. An important observation pertains to the fact that calculating
wmod2m can be done by taking the m least signicant bits in the binary representation of w.
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As a concluding remark, one can see that various procedures have been proposed in the past
for calculating b 1mod2m. Some lend themselves to software execution on a general proces-
sor utilizing word-level multiplications. The overall computational e¤ort associated with such
procedures is equivalent to more than one multiplication of m-bit operands. Other procedures,
having overall computational e¤ort equivalent to one multiplication of m-bit operands, are ex-
ecuted on a bit-level and are not suitable for software implementation using a general-purpose
processor (i.e., they cannot e¢ ciently utilize word-level multiplications). This subsection pre-
sented a procedure for calculating r = b 1mod2m which on the one hand is suitable for soft-
ware implementation using a general-purpose processor, while on the other hand it utilizes
processor-word multiplications. When counting the total number of such multiplications, the
computational e¤ort involved in calculating r is two thirds of one multiplication of m-bit values,
plus a few word-level multiplications, whose number in practice does not exceed twelve. This
combines the best individual performances of known procedures, when considering minimal
computational e¤ort and ability for software execution on a general-purpose processor. To the
best of the authorsknowledge, the mathematical principle on which the proposed procedure
relies is novel and is not an extension or modication of known approaches.
6.2.2 Calculating the Expression  b 1mod (2m)
This specic calculation of  b 1mod (2m) occurs frequently when performing any general mod-
ular calculations, in particular when establishing point-by-scalar multiplications using ECC.
The negative modular 2m multiplicative inverse of a parameter, b, is dened as b 1mod(2m):
Accordingly, if we dene the parameter r0 to be the negative modular multiplicative inverse of
b, then r0 =  b 1mod (2m) : Hence, b  r0 mod (2m) =  1; or b  r0 = x  2m   1 (where x is
an arbitrary number). From the latter expression we understand that the product r0  b is a
multiplicative of 2m;  1: To that end, this product is of the form of XF in hexadecimal format,
where X is an undened character of m bits and F = (111::::1)2 with the length of m bits as
well.
If, theoretically, we would have had the positive modular 2m multiplicative inverse of b; i.e.
r; (e¢ cient calculation of which is showed in the section above), then the best and simplest way
of calculating the negative value would be to simply use the following identity: r0 = 2m   r:
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xx… ...x 11… ...1
m bits m bits
Figure 6-7: The format of the expression r0  b = x  2m   1
Unfortunately, having prior knowledge of r is almost never the case, hence e¢ cient calculations
are required here as well.
Straightforward Calculations
Let kH and kL respectively denote the higher half and lower half of the binary representation
of a 2m  bit value k. Each of these halves is an m  bit value. The relation b  r0 = 1mod (2m)
means that b  r0 = x  2m   1 for some integer x. This implies that the m-bit expression
(b  r0)L = (111:::111)2, as illustrated in gure 6-7.
Since the multiplication r0  b has the structure indicated above, calculating r is rather
straightforward:
1. Add shifts of the binary representation b such that the addition of the shifts generates
the m least signicant bits 111:::1
2. Adding the coe¢ cients of the added shifts form the binary representation of r0
Lets look at the following example in which we want to calculate the negative modular
Multiplicative Inverse of 13 given that m = 4. In other words, we would like to calculate r0




: We will begin by shifting and adding the binary representation of
13, i.e. (1101)2, until the least signicant part of the additions will include four 1s (see gure
6-8).
Since the coe¢ cients of the added shifts are 20; 21 and 23; the representation of r0 is
20 + 21 + 23 = (11)10 = (1011)2 ) 11, which is the negative modular multiplicative inverse
of 13: As indicated above, this bit-wise straightforward procedure for calculating a negative
multiplicative inverse modulo 2m is rather time consuming. Hence, a better and more e¢ cient
way of calculations is highly desirable.
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      1101
        1101
1101
    10001111
Figure 6-8: Shifting and adding the binary representation of the number 13 until the least
signicant part of the additions includes four 1s
E¢ cient Calculations
Let b and r0 be given m   bit values, where r0 =  b 1mod 2m. Let q be a given 2m   bit
value where qL = b: It is next shown how to e¢ ciently calculate p =  q 1mod 22m, utilizing
the above. We note the following known values:
1. The value of r0, where r0 =  b 1mod2m
2. The value of q
3. The fact that qL = b
As in section 6.2.1, obtaining p is partitioned into three steps; calculating the lower half;
i.e. pL (m-bits), calculating of the higher half, i.e. pH (m-bits) and nalizing the entire
value p:
 The lower half of p is given by
pL = r
 The higher half is given by
pH = [[(r
0  b)H + [r0  qH ]L + 1]  r0]mod 2m
 Calculate p by performing the following:
p = pH jpL
Proof of these derivations will proceed the following example.
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As an example, lets consider the case of nding p =  q 1mod232, given that q = 99F8A5EF
and qL = b, where r0 = D6F1 =  A5EF 1mod216: Using the e¢ cient calculation described
above, we can derive that pL = r = D6F1: In order to calculate pH we need to follow three
easy steps:
1. (r0  b)H = (D6F1xA5EF )H = 8B51
2. (r0  qH)L = (99F8xD6F1)L = 4278
3. pH = [[(r0  b)H + [r0  (q)H ]L + 1]  r0]mod 216 = (CDCAxD6F1)mod 216 = 972A
In order to receive an accurate result of p, all that is left is the concatenation, hence
p = pH jpL = 972AjD6F1 = 972AD6F1: The result can be checked using the following identity:
p  q = 972AD6F1  99F8A5EF = 5AEB6DF1FFFFFFFF =  1mod232: As in the previous
case, this method can be used to e¢ ciently and easily calculate the negative inverse modulo
2m of a large value, by rst calculating the negative modular multiplicative inverse of a much
smaller part of this given value. The rst calculation (the given r0 in the above expressions)
can be used for further calculations. Evaluation of the larger number will be based upon the
known r0 and will increase by powers of 2.
Proof
All of the parameters in the following proof represent binary numbers. By knowing r0; b and
m; where r0 =  b 1mod2m; we can show that calculating the expression p =  q 1mod22m
where qL = b; can be done by using the e¢ cient calculation described above. The identity
p =  q 1mod22m implies that p  q =  1mod 22m. Since p  pHpL and q  qHqL; the
expression p  q takes the form (pHpL)  (qHqL) = pH  qH  22m + (pH  qL + pL  qH)  2m +
pL  qL (as in the previous case). Requiring that (pHpL)  (qHqL) =  1mod 22m means that
(pH  qL + pL  qH)  2m + pL  qL =  1mod 22m. That is, the least signicant 2m bits of
(pH  qL + pL  qH)  2m + pL  qL should all be 10s.
Calculating the Lower Part of p We note the fact that the least signicant m bits of
(pH  qL + pL  qH)  2m + pL  qL are the least signicant m bits of pL  qL. Hence, only
pL  qL dictates that the m least signicant bits of (pH  qL + pL  qH)  2m + pL  qL will be
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1s. The last observation suggests that pL  qL =  1mod 2m: Since qL = b we conclude that
pL =  b 1mod2m. Since it is given that r0 =  b 1mod2m it follows that pL = r0.
Calculating the Higher Part of p According to the preceding result, the expression (pH 
qL + pL  qH)  2m + pL  qL has m least signicant 10s, for pL = r0. The second portion of m (to
the left of these m least signicant 1s ) are identied as [pH  qL+ pL  qH+ (pL  qL)H ]mod 2m.
Given that [pH  qL + pL  qH+ (pL  qL)H ] =  1mod 2m; the bits identied as [pH  qL + pL 
qH+ (pL  qL)H ]mod 2m should also be 1. Since pL = r0; we receive the following expression:
[pH  qL + r0  qH+ (r0  qL)H ] =  1mod 2m. Furthermore, from the identity r0 =  b 1mod2m
it follows that b =   (r0) 1mod2m. Substituting this into the preceding relation yields:  pH 
(r0) 1mod2m =  r0  qH   (r0  b)H   1mod 2m, that is: pH = r0  [r0  qH + (r0  b)H + 1]mod
2m:
To avoid handling large values, the expression r0  (q)H can be reduced mod 2m inside the




This dissertation has described novel foundations needed to develop a more resilient infrastruc-
ture for securing resource-constrained sensor networks. In particular, practical algorithms for
accelerating the computations involved in both pairwise and group key establishments have
been of primary focus. Basic cryptographic arithmetic operations have been revised in order
to accommodate the unique attributes of WSNs. This has yielded interesting results that have
potential impact to the eld of applied cryptography as a whole. The following summarizes the
primary contributions made in this dissertation.
7.1 Self-Certied Public Key Generation with O¤-loading Pro-
visioning
A primary contribution made in this work pertains to the introduction of o¤-loading techniques
in the context of ECC-based self-certied public key generation. O¤-loading non-secure tasks
from a component having low resources to an assisting node was described in detail, applied
to both xed and ephemeral key generations. O¤-loading allows for prolonging of the network
lifetime, by distributing the computational e¤ort across more nodes. This directly answers the
challenge of minimizing resources, while adapting to the ad-hoc topology of the network. Suc-
cessful implementations of these algorithms on both the Intel mote 2 platform and TelosB mote
accentuate the practical aspects of this contribution. The positive impact of o¤-loading with
regard to network lifetime and overall reduction in computation time was evaluated through
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simulations that addressed randomly deployed sensor nodes. To complement the pairwise key
generation scheme, an extension to group key generation has been proposed, introducing a
linear increase in energy and time with respect to the network density.
7.2 Delay-e¢ cient Group Key Generation
A more e¢ cient group key generation scheme has been proposed for WSN applications where
the overall process time is critical. The scheme is an extension to the Burmester and Desmedt
(BD) algorithm, with a trade o¤between energy consumption and overall key generation latency
when compared to the group key generation process established when using the self-certied
pairwise key method. Executing an independent signature generation/verication procedure
performed when validating ephemeral values is not necessary in this group key generation. As
in the case of pairwise key generation, identication of malicious elements in the network is
achieved via key conrmation processes.
7.3 Resource-e¢ cient Denial-of-service Mitigation
In order to address the fundamental issue of attacks that target the energy of sensor nodes by
repeatedly requesting key establishments, an e¢ cient scheme for mitigating such attacks has
been proposed and analyzed. The key idea is to shift the computational burden on the node
initiating the session, rather than that which is being approached. A careful study of various
alternatives for achieving this goal has been carried out.
7.4 Light-weight Arithmetic Algorithms
In order to retain high-performance when resources are scarce, it is imperative to revisit the
implementations of fundamental cryptographic functions. Here, a substantial contribution was
made in implementing Montgomery operations more e¢ ciently by considering the network
involved. Improvements of the modular multiplicative inverse calculation were also introduced.
For the latter, the computational resources were dramatically decreased from a complexity
of O(m) to that of O(logm). We have proven that this procedure for calculating the modular
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multiplicative inverse is suitable for software implementation using a general-purpose processor,
while utilizing processor-word multiplications. This achievement was made without incurring
substantial memory cost (as is typical in other time/space trade-o¤ techniques).
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